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INTRODUCTION
The developing. world faces environmental problems of staggering di-
mension. Many areas are experiencing massive rates of deforestation, an
activity which leads to the extinction of thousands, perhaps millions, of
species, intensifies flooding and droughts, increases erosion, and clogs
downstream rivers and hydroelectric reservoirs.' Coastal resources are
often ruthlessly exploited,2 while the unsustainable harvesting of fuel-
wood and poor agricultural practices exhaust soil fertility and push poor
farmers onto even more marginal plots of land.3 Over one-fourth of the
people in the developing world (some. 1.3 billion people) lack access to a
safe and reliable water supply, 4 and approximately one in two (nearly 2.6
billion people) lack sanitation services. Access to basic sanitation serv-
ices, however, does not imply that collected wastewater is treated. In
fact, over 90 percent of the sewage collected in the developing world is
discharged without receiving any treatment at all.6 As a result, water-
borne diseases and infections are responsible for 80 percent of all ill-
nesses in the developing world.7 The World Bank believes that improved
1. See. e.g., U. N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 26-30, 44-45,
48, 81-83 (1997) [hereinafter UNEP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK]; Janet N. Abramovitz,
Taking a Stand: Cultivating a New Relationship with the World's Forests, WORLDWATCH PAPER
No. 140, Apr. 1998; John C. Ryan, Life Support: Conserving Biological Diversity, WORLDWATCH
PAPER No. 108, Apr. 1992; Kenton R. Miller et. al., Deforestation and Species Loss, in PRESERVING
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (Jessica Tuchman Mathews ed., 1991); NORMAN MYERS, THE
PRIMARY SOURCE: TROPICAL FORESTS AND OUR FUTURE (1984).
2. See, e.g., UNEP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at 33-34, 49-51, 85-87;
Charles Victor Barber & Vaughan R. Pratt, Poison and Profits: Cyanide Fishing in the Indo-Pacific,,
ENV'T, Oct. 1998, at 4; Robert Cribb, Environmental Policy and Politics in Indonesia, in
ECOLOGICAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 81 (Uday Desai ed., 1998); Bik-
sham Guija & Andrea Finger-Stich, What Price Prawn? Shrimp Aquaculture's Impact in Asia,
ENV'T, Sept. 1996, at 12.
3. See, e.g., UNEP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at 25-26, 42-44, 80-81; Gary
Gardner, Shrinking Fields: Cropland Loss in a World of Eight Billion, WORLDWATCH PAPER NO.
131, Jul. 1996; Mark W. Rosegrant & Robert Livemash, Growing More Food, Doing Less Damage,
ENV'T, Sept. 1996, at 6, 9-10.
4. See PETER GLEICK, THE WORLD'S WATER 1998-1999: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON
FRESHWATER RESOURCES 40 (1998) (citing a 1996 estimate issued by the World Health Organiza-
tion); see also SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY 21 (1992) (citing a figure
of 1.2 billion people).
5. See GLEICK, supra note 4, at 40.
6. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97 21 (1996) [hereinafter
WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97].
7. See POSTEL, supra note 4, at 21. These problems even afflict more rapidly developing coun-
tries. In China, for example, over 80 percent of the municipal sewage is discharged untreated- thus
it should come as no surprise that China's two leading infectious diseases are waterbome dysentery
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water supplies and adequate sanitation would result in two million fewer
deaths from diarrhea each year, 200 million fewer cases of diarrheal ill-
ness each year, 300 million fewer cases of roundworm infection, and 150
million fewer instances of schistosomiasis.8
Urban third world conditions are often appalling and are growing
worse. Up to two thirds of the solid waste generated in the cities of the
developing world is not collected but, rather, piles up along streets and in
storm sewers, contributing to the spread of disease. 9 More than 1.1 bil-
lion people in these cities suffer from unhealthy levels of air pollution.'0
The World Bank estimates, in fact, that health costs related to air pollu-
tion in China alone will rise to $98 billion by 2020."1 Of urban residents
worldwide, at least 220 million have no access to clean drinking water,
while over 420 million lack access to basic sanitation facilities, and, in
hundreds of cities around the world, industrial as well as municipal
wastewater is dumped directly into rivers and harbors with little or no
treatment.' 2 The urban population in the developing world, meanwhile,
is skyrocketing at the rate of 150,000 people every day.' 3
For decades, however, environmental protection was often considered
a luxury that only wealthy nations could afford. In the rest of the world,
the first priority of governments has been to meet the basic needs of their
people - food, clothing, shelter, and to ensure economic growth.' 4 In
fact, many in the developing world believed that environmental destruc-
tion was an inherent by-product of the development process, and thus,
and hepatitis. See W. Scott Railton, The Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Protection in China,
7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 859, 859-60 (1998).
8. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 49 (1992).
9. See JORGE E. HARDOY ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 58-59
(1992).
10. See WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97, supra note 6, at i. The World Health Organization esti-
mates that more than 4 million children in the developing world have died from respiratory diseases
related to poor air quality. See Alan D. Hecht, The Triad of Sustainable Development: Promoting
Sustainable Development in Developing Countries, 8 J. ENV'T & DEV. 111, 114 (1999).
11. See Elizabeth Economy, Painting China Green: The Next Sino-Soviet Tussle, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 16 (quoting WHO and the World Resources Institute).
12. See WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97, supra note 6, at 1. The World Bank has conservatively es-
timated that air and water pollution currently costs China about $54 billion annually. See WORLD
BANK, CLEAN WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997)
(based on health care costs, agricultural and fishery losses, crop and forest damage, premature
deaths, and so on).
13. See WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97, supra note 6, at 4.
14. See Edward D. McCutcheon, Think Globally. (En)Act Locally. Promoting Effective National
Environmental Regulatory Infrastructure in Developing Nations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 395, 407-
408 (1998); Kilaparti Ramakrishna, The Emergence of Environmental Law in the Developing Coun-
tries: A Case Study of India, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 907, 908 (1985).
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that a clean environment would mean less economic growth. 5  As the
late Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi asked at the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment, "How can we speak to those
who live in the villages and in the slums about keeping the oceans, the
rivers, and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated? Are not
poverty and need the greatest polluters?" 16
Therefore, despite the recognition at the Stockholm Conference that
growth and environmental protection were not only compatible but actu-
ally linked together, 7 little account was taken of the impact of develop-
ment activities upon the environment until the 1980s, when the connec-
tion between development and the environment became all too painfully
obvious.' Gigantic mining projects, huge hydroelectric dams, and other
large development projects "were unleashing ecological destruction and
social upheaval in areas larger than many American states or European
countries."' 9  In what proved the most infamous example of ill-
15. This belief led some to conclude that the concern of wealthy, developed nations for improving
environmental quality was merely a ploy to keep the developing world "economically and politically
subservient to Western capitalist and neocolonial interests." Olusegun Areola, Comparative Envi-
ronmental Issues and Policies in Nigeria, in ECOLOGICAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 241; see ioao Augusto de Araujo Castro, Environment and Develop-
ment: The Case of the Developing Countries, 26 INT'L ORG. 401 (1972) (contending that environ-
mental protection would tend "to perpetuate the existing gap in socioeconomic development be-
tween developed and developing countries and so promote the freezing of the present international
order").
16. ALAN S. MILLER, A PLANET TO CHOOSE: VALUE STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY 49 (1978).
17. Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration, for example, urged states to "adopt an integrated
and co-ordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is com-
patible with the need to protect and improve [the] environment for the benefit of their population."
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 1972, STOCKHOLM
DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 1, 4, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. (1973), reprinted in II I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 2, furthermore,
emphasized the compelling need for intergenerational equity (" [t]he natural resources of the earth..
. must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management"), while Principle 9 urged nations to adopt environmental policies that "enhance" the
"development potential of developing countries." Id.
18. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
3-4 (1992). Many developing countries, however, did act during the 1970s to create agencies with
some sort of environmental management responsibilities. See H. Jeffrey Leonard & David Morrell,
Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 283
(1981) (recounting that, while environmental agencies existed in only I I developing countries at the
time of the Stockholm Conference, 102 governments in the Third World had such agencies by
1980). Many of these agencies, however, were quite small and exceedingly weak. See id. at 308.
19. BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT 25 (1994). See generally Akin L. Ma-
bogunje, The Environmental Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, ENV'T., May 1995, at 8 (detailing
the environmental degradation and wetlands losses caused by various dams in West Africa); Bruce
Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Policy, and the United States, 12 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 681 (1985) (contending that the most serious impacts were associated with projects in the
following funding areas: agriculture and rural development, energy, and transportation); CHERYL
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considered development, the World Bank provided $440 million in fi-
nancing to pave a 1,500 mile dirt road leading from Brazil's populous
south into the central rainforest of Rondonia. The bulldozers were fol-
lowed by thousands of impoverished settlers who literally incinerated the
forests of the Amazon as they sought a better life and a plot of land to
call their own. Unfortunately, most of these settlers were unable to eke
out an existence from the thin, sandy soil of the Amazon basin once the
nutrients from the ashes were exhausted.20 It was becoming all too obvi-
ous that resources like forests, soil, water, fisheries and wildlife would
have to be protected in order to ensure continuing improvements in the
quality of life.2'
Thus, in 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (WCED) was able to demonstrate in convincing fashion how the
environment and economic growth are linked together in a complex web
of cause and effect.22 The Commission found that care must be taken to
ensure that development is environmentally sustainable,23  for
PAYER, THE WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982) (exploring the adverse environmental
effects associated with dozens of development projects).
20. See Hilary F. French, Reforming the United Nations to Ensure Environmentally Sustainable
Development, 1994 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB.S 559, 574-575; RICH, MORTGAGING THE
EARTH, supra note 19, at 26-29; ADRIAN COWELL, THE DECADE OF DESTRUCTION: THE CRUSADE
TO SAVE THE AMAZON RAIN FOREST (1990). Large areas of Amazonian forest were also destroyed
by Brazil's Greater Carajas project, which included the development of an open-pit iron ore mine, a
railroad, and deepwater port facilities. The World Bank provided over $300 million to help build the
infrastructure for the project. See Marvin S. Soroos, Global Institutions and the Environment: An
Evolutionary Perspective, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 45
(Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT]. For a
comprehensive discussion of the environmental problems facing the Amazon and some proposals for
the economic and ecological survival of the region, see JUAN DE ONIS, THE GREEN CATHEDRAL,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AMAZONIA (1992).
... 21. The World Bank responded to the criticism it received by, inter alia, requiring an environ-
mental assessment for any bank-financed or implemented project and increasing its environmental
staff from 5 in 1985 to 162 in 1995. See CAROL LANCASTER, AID TO AFRICA: SO MUCH TO DO, So
LITTLE DONE 200 (1999). But see Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Assessing the Impact of
NGO Advocacy Campaigns on World Bank Projects and Policies, in THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 528-31 (Jonathan A.
Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (arguing that the Bank's internal structure limits the ability of its
environmental staff to effect change).
22. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The Commission is also commonly referred to as the
Brundtland Commission, and OUR COMMON FUTURE as the Brundtland Report.
23. The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own need."
Id. at 43. The definition has been criticized as too anthropocentric in nature- focusing primarily on
ways to harness nature to meet human needs while not adequately acknowledging an ethical obliga-
tion which humans owe to other living things. Michael McCloskey, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
The Conundrum of Sustainable Development, 9 DUKE ENV'T. L. & POL'Y F. 153, 154-155 (1999).
Others contend that the concept of sustainable development is so malleable that it is virtually mean-
ingless. See David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Recon-
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"[d]evelopment cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental re-
source base; the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves
out of account the costs of environmental destruction." 24 The concept of
"sustainable development" also dominated the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which was
held in Rio de Janeiro. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration, in fact, de-
clares that "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of
the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from
it. 25
The WCED recognized in 1987 that the implementation of national
policies capable of protecting the environment and sustaining economic
development would depend upon institutional and legal reform. 26 Thus,
the WCED called for the establishment and strengthening of environ-
mental agencies in developing countries and called upon bilateral and
multilateral international donor organizations to provide additional as-
sistance to support the development of both governmental and non-
governmental environmental institutions. 27 In addition, the WCED rec-
ommended that governments develop and strengthen their national laws
to protect the environment and support sustainable development,28 and at
UNCED, the world community in Agenda 21 urged international aid
sidered, 3 WID. L. SYMP. J. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing that the concept is "so plastic that it shields most
any decision from the charge of unsustainability"); Gonther Handl, Controlling Implementation of
and Compliance with International Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio, 5
COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 312 (1994) (claiming that sustainability is a notion "subject to mu-
tually incompatible interpretive claims").
24. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 22, at 37. McCloskey has criticized this aspect of the
Brundtland Report as well declaring that "[flailure of a development after 20-30 years is of little
significance to investors" if" in that time, their project can pay off profitably." McCloskey, supra
note 23, at 157. The viability of development in a strictly economic sense, therefore, is a question of
time. Nations must decide whether their interest in long-term sustainability should trump what Peter
Savage called the "logic of haste" that is imposed by the pressure for immediate development. See
Peter Savage, Temporal Perspectives in Development Administration, in TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS OF
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 31 (Dwight Waldo ed., 1970).
25. U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Rio DECLARATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. I Princ. 4 (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio DECLARATION].
26. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 22, at 20-21. The Rio Declaration subsequently provided
that "[s]tates shall enact effective environmental legislation." Rio Declaration, supra note 25, at
Prin. 11.
27. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 22, at 319. Total bilateral development assistance for all
purposes amounted to $51.5 billion in 1998. This represented 0.23 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the donor countries- well below the 0.33 percent given in 1992. Judged by na-
tional income, Denmark was the most generous donor, giving 0.99 percent of GDP, followed by
Norway (0.91 percent), the Netherlands (0.80 percent), and Sweden (0.71 percent). The United
States was the least generous, contributing just 0.1 percent of its GDP to foreign aid. See Interna-
tional Aid, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 93.
28. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 22, at 330.
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agencies to provide the developing countries "with technical assistance
in their attempts to enhance their national legislative capabilities in the
field of environmental law." 
29
The 1990s, as a result, witnessed a burst of assistance efforts designed
to improve both the legal and institutional capacities of developing
countries to protect the environment. 30  The U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), for instance, provided substantial re-
sources to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)31 and to the
American Bar Association's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
29. U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/6/Rev. I para. 39.1(d) (1992), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, AGENDA 21: THE
UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM RIO 15, 1993; 4 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED
PROCEEDINGS I (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993) [hereinafter AGENDA 21].
30. See Ruth Greenspan Bell, EPA's International Assistance Efforts: Developing Effective Envi-
ronmental Institutions and Partners, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,593 n.4 (Oct. 1994)
(stating that the WCED report served to encourage donors to include environmental protection as "a
specific objective" of their assistance programs). These efforts were reacting to the fact that, while
many countries in the developing world had established environmental ministries and entered into
numerous international conventions during the 1970s and 1980s, their ability to actually improve
environmental conditions had often proved lacking. See generally John McCormick, The Role of
Environmental NGOs in International Regimes, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 20, at
52.
Ruth Greenspan Bell has explored specific reasons why nations such as the United States have
made environmental assistance available. In addition to humanitarian reasons, she cites the reduc-
tion of international threats to the U.S. environment (such as ozone depletion and the loss of biodi-
versity) and the advancement of U.S. foreign policy goals such as international stability, democratic
governance, transparency in government decision making, and the establishment or entrenchment of
the rule of law. See Bell, supra at 10,594-95. Peter Veit, Tanvi Nagpal, and Thomas Fox recently
defined U.S. interests as the promotion of:
economic security by creating markets for U.S. goods and jobs for U.S. citizens; protecting the
United States against specific global dangers, such as rapid population growth, biodiversity
loss, and climate change, that threaten the well-being of American citizens; enhancing the
chances for peace and stability everywhere in the world; and preventing crises that require ex-
pensive peacekeeping and emergency relief and that often precipitate floods of refugees and
immigrants.
Peter Veit et al., Africa 's Wealth, Woes, Worth, in AFRICA'S VALUABLE ASSETS: A READER IN
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 13 (Peter Veit ed., 1998) [hereinafter AFRICA'S VALUABLE
ASSETS]. U.S. foreign aid also directly benefits those U.S. contractors who provide various goods
and services (including consulting services) to the U.S. foreign aid program. For a more general
discussion of the goals of foreign assistance, see LANCASTER, supra note 21, at 75-77 (1999); DAVID
HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE FOREIGN AID REGIME,
1949-1989 (1993). For histories of U.S. foreign aid, see VERNON W. RUTTAN, UNITED STATES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID (1996);
STEPHEN HELLINGER, ET AL., AID FOR JUST DEVELOPMENT: REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE 13-28 (1988).
31. See Bell, supra note 30, at n.6 (stating that funding from USAID generally covers the travel of
EPA staff members, as well as grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements that support EPA's
foreign work). At the same time, EPA made its international program a high priority and increased
the personnel in its Office for International Activities, moving towards a total complement of 100
staffers. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, E.P.A. HISTORY PROGRAM, WILLIAM K.
REILLY, ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW 4, at 54 (1995).
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(CEELI)3 2 to help them provide environmental assistance to the nations
of the former Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union.33 Other donors, including
USAID and many bilateral foreign assistance programs from Western
Europe and Scandinavia, were engaged in similar activities not only in
the states of the former Warsaw Pact, but also in Africa, Asia and Latin
America.34 International agencies such as the U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), 3 the World Bank,36 the U.N. Development Programme
32. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CEELI 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (USAID provided al-
most 74 percent of CEELI's $10.7 million budget in 1997- a portion of which was devoted to envi-
ronmental law reform).
33. These efforts represent part of USAID's overall strategy of linking development aid and envi-
ronmental protection, a strategy that includes the strengthening of public policies and institutional
capacities to protect the environment. USAID has explained that these objectives serve U.S. inter-
ests because of the threats that pollution, resource depletion, and environmental degradation pose to
international peace, stability, and the economic well-being of the world community. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: U.S. FUNDING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES 19-20 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter U.S. FUNDING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS].
34. The Government of the Netherlands, for instance, has been especially active in the develop-
ment of environmental law and capacity building in the developing world. See Donald Kaniaru &
Charles 0. Okidi, Partnership in Action: UNEP/UNDP Joint Project on Environmental Law in Af-
rica, in UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
229 (Sun Lin & Lal Kurukulasuriya eds., 1995) [hereinafter UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD]. Other
donors that have been active in the strengthening of environmental institutions include the Swedish
International Development Agency (Sida) (called the Swedish International Development Authority
or SIDA prior to a recent reorganization), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD), and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). See, e.g., DONOR
SUPPORTED ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN TANZANIA (Bente Ejsing Svantesson ed., Mar. 1995)
(on file with the author). USAID was also involved in capacity building activities in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia. See generally U.S. FUNDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at
19-20; Eric Dannemaier, Importance of Environmental Law to Meeting USAID 's Strategic Objec-
tives, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SB79 ALI-ABA 227, 228-29 (1997); MELINDA
CUELLAR, SIDA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE FOR TANZANIA 18 (July 1993) (referring to USAID's
support to the Wildlife Division in the Tanzanian Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources, and Envi-,
ronment) (on file with the author). For excellent overviews of the foreign development programs in
the 21 OECD countries, see THE REALITY OF AID 1996: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL AID (Judith Randel & Tony German eds., 1996); OECD, DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION: EFFORTS AND POLICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
COMMITTEE (1998). See also LANCASTER, supra note 21 (examining the African aid programs of
the United States, Britain, France, Sweden, Italy, and Japan).
35. In 1991, the UNEP Governing Council directed UNEP's Environmental Law Unit to provide
assistance, upon request, to developing countries to help them enact domestic environmental legisla-
tion and establish appropriate institutional arrangements. See Donald Kaniaru et al., UNEP's Pro-
gramme of Assistance on National Legislation and Institutions, in UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD,
supra note 34, at 154-55. Prior to 1991, UNEP had established a clearing house program which was
designed to provide environmental and organizational expertise to the Third World. See Ganther
Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World Countries: Common Destiny-
Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603,609 (1988).
36. In recent years, the World Bank has provided technical assistance to help develop legal and
institutional capacity in some 50 countries. This assistance has taken various forms: the develop-
ment of national framework environmental laws; the establishment of national environmental action
plans (NEAPs); and the drafting of implementing legislation for certain international treaties where
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(UNDP),37 and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were
also involved,38 as was the World Conservation Union (IUCN).39  The
FAO, in fact, has provided legal assistance to help a number of island
governments draft legislation providing for Environmental Impact As-
sessments as well as other statutes.40
The development of law and the strengthening of the institutional ar-
rangements for its implementation are tasks of crucial significance for
the nations of the developing world. Environmental considerations must
be integrated into the planning and decision-making processes for devel-
opment activities if sustainable development is ever to become a real-
ity. 4' While the development of national policies and strategies for sus-
tainable development is a vital first step, laws and regulations are
necessary to help translate these new policies into action.42 New or bet-
domestic implementation of a particular treaty is a condition precedent for funding under the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF). See Charles E. Di Leva, The World Bank and the Environment,
SB79 ALI-ABA 209, 214-15 (1997). The Bank has also occasionally financed projects which focus
upon the development of human capital such as a program which was designed to ensure that envi-
ronmental law was taught at two Indian law schools. See Charles E. Di Leva, International Envi-
ronmental Law and Development, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 501, 507 (1998).
37. Through its Capacity 21 initiative, UNDP has been assisting countries to formulate sustainable
development strategies and to enhance their ability to implement the resulting programs and policies.
See Alexander Timoshenko & Mark Berman, The United Nations Environment Programme and the
United Nations Development Programme, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 50-51 (Ja-
cob Werksman ed., 1996). JNDP, for example, developed a project in conjunction with UNEP and
financed by a $5 million grant from the Dutch government, with cooperation from a number of in-
ternational organizations including the World Bank- which is intended to foster the development of
environmental law and institutions in Africa over a five year period. See Kaniaru & Okidi, supra
note 34, at 229.
38. FAO has been particularly concerned with providing legislative assessments and drafting as-
sistance in areas such as forestry, fisheries, soil protection, national parks, and protected area man-
agement. See id.; see also Svantesson, supra note 34, at 43 (referring to FAO supported review of
forestry policy and legislation for Zanzibar).
39. See Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of Na-
tional, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 31 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 307, 329 (1995); Kaniaru & Okidi, supra note 34, at 229. The IUCN Environmental Law Pro-
gramme has provided legal training and technical assistance to developing countries and maintains
an extensive environmental law database. The IUCN was instrumental in encouraging a number of
developing countries to prepare National Conservation Strategies. For a brief discussion of the his-
tory and organization of the IUCN, see McCormick, The Role of Environmental NGOs in Interna-
tional Regimes, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 20, at 58, 63-64. Legal and technical
assistance has also been provided by a number of other non-governmental organizations including
the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide and the Center for Intemational Environmental Law.
40. See, e.g., Svantesson, supra note 34, at 41 (referring to a now-completed project to draft envi-
ronmental legislation with an appropriate institutional structure for Zanzibar).
41. See AGENDA 21, supra note 29, at para. 8.2 (stating that an "adjustment or even a fundamental
reshaping of decision-making, in the light of country-specific conditions, may be necessary if envi-
ronment and development is to be put at the centre of economic and political decision-making, in
effect achieving a full integration ofthese factors.").
42. See id. at para. 8.13 (stating that "[flaws and regulations suited to country-specific conditions
are among the most important instruments for transforming environment and development policies
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ter laws, however, are not enough. These governments must also have
an administrative structure with the capacity and the motivation to im-
plement and enforce the new legal regime and include the use of Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment for proposed projects and development
planning.
The creation of such a framework for environmental management is no
easy task. Effective execution involves much more than sending in a
team of outside consultants who may draft a statute (perhaps relying
upon some standardized code or similar statutory shortcut after conduct-
ing a little research and a few interviews), hold a seminar to receive
comments, and then submit the "revised" version to the appropriate
ministry. Such approaches often fail to take into account the enormous
economic, cultural, institutional, and legal differences which exist among
these sovereign states. They may also fail to reflect many national and
local concerns. More time, more money, more thought, and more locally
generated support and commitment are usually required if the resulting
legal mechanisms are going to work in the society for which they are in-
tended.
In fact, the development of a strong and enforceable legal regime
ought to be regarded as a process which can only be undertaken in a
phased approach. The process would include:
* a comprehensive study of existing law and institutional arrange-
ments;
* the establishment of a vision for legal and institutional reform;
* the development of priorities for the sequencing of legal and institu-
tional reform;
* joint planning and coordination among donors to fund the various
stages of this process;
* the crafting of an effective approach to environmental impact as-
sessment;
* the development of an appropriate institutional structure for envi-
ronmental management;
* a recognition that necessary legal reform may extend beyond sub-
stantive environmental law to include various aspects of the administra-
tive process, such as notice, public participation, access to information,
and judicial review;
* the creation of national ownership through the involvement of local
professionals and the solicitation of broad public input during all stages
of the process, including the drafting phase;
into action....").
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* the provision of appropriate and long-term capacity building, which
would include the strengthening of local environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including public interest environ-
mental law organizations.
Many obstacles stand in the way of initiating such a long-term process.
Donors and recipients share an interest in trying to complete single proj-
ects with more clearly defined benchmarks, more tangible results, and a
shorter time horizon. Donors and recipients are also generally resistant
to joint planning and coordination of funding efforts. Donors, moreover,
may be hesitant about committing resources to a process that may even-
tually focus more immediate attention on local problems like air and
water pollution rather than on problems of particular interest to the tax-
payers in the industrialized world, such as ozone depletion and the wild-
life sector.43 The creation of an effective regulatory program, however,
is an essential building block for achieving and practicing sustainable
development.44 It is a building block that will demand a certain vision
and courage not only on the part of the developing nation, but also on the
part of the donors.
I. THE COMPLEX TASK OF DRAFTING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
Some commentators have suggested that an effective structure for en-
vironmental management can be developed by following a clear se-
quence of action involving four steps.45 First, a national environmental
policy must be developed in order to provide general direction and guid-
ance. Second, a coherent body of environmental law must be drafted to
pr6vide a framework for implementing the national environmental pol-
icy. Third, appropriate institutional structures must be established to im-
plement the new legislation. Finally, the governmental structures estab-
lished in step three must develop the capacity (trained staff and
appropriate facilities, for instance) to implement the law.46 While the
43. See Barbara Connolly, Increments for the Earth: The Politics of Environmental Aid, in
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID 330 (Robert O. Keohane & Marc A. Levy eds., 1996).
44. See Hecht, supra note 10, at 115. Hecht argues that sustainable development itself ought to be
viewed as a process which is achievable only in stages and would contain building blocks such as "a
strong, fair, and enforceable regulatory framework;" an informed and educated public; free-market
policies; risk-based environmental policies; political leadership; "a sound scientific framework for
decision making;" and public participation in government decision making. Id.
45. See e.g., B.B. NGANWA KAMUGASHA, WORLD BANK, DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL CAPABILITIES FOR DEALING WITH ENVIRONMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2 (Env't. Div.,
Technical Dept., World Bank Africa Region, July 1989) (on file with the author).
46. See id.
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four-step formula certainly reflects the key components of any successful
system for environmental management - policy, law, administration,
and capacity - it seems to relegate the consideration of legal and insti-
tutional arrangements to artificially isolated chambers, destined for se-
quential consideration once the necessary policy document has been de-
veloped. Such an approach appears to be overly formalistic and does not
reflect the way in which questions about law, implementation, and insti-
tutional capacities blend together. The task of crafting a functional sys-
tem for environmental protection is quite difficult because of the symbi-
otic relationship that exists among these factors and because law reform
efforts take place against the background of pre-existing legal, political,
and institutional arrangements.
In virtually all developing countries there is some form of preexisting
environmental legislation.4 7 At times, the volume of such legislation is
staggering (just as it often is in developed countries). In Tanzania, for
example, there are over 50 pieces of legislation which relate to the envi-
ronment, much of it dating from the colonial period.41 Most of this leg-
islation in Tanzania and elsewhere deals with natural resources such as
forests, water, mining, wildlife, and fisheries, and it is not unusual to find
that these laws are not only outmoded in many instances, but are also ne-
glected to the limited extent that they could be used to protect the envi-
47. BARBARA J. LAUSCHE, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 16 (Oct. 1989) (on file with the author); BAKER &
MCKENZIE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 1-2 (Osvaldo R.I. Agatiello ed.,
1995).
48. See NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF TANZANIA, NATIONAL
CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT App.1 (revised proposal, May 1995)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter NAT'L CONSERVATION STRATEGY]; UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA, MINISTRY OF TOURISM, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT ACTION PLAN: A FIRST STEP 42 (June 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
NEAP]. For an analysis of these statutes and ordinances, see LAWYERS' ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION
TEAM, REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL MANDATES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA (July 1999) (on file with the author) [hereinafter LEAT Report];
LAURA HITCHCOCK, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF
TouRISM, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, REPORT ON EXISTING LEGISLATION
PERTAINING TO ENVIRONMENT (May 1994) (on file with the author). A concise discussion of Tan-
zanian environmental and natural resource law is found in Posanyi J. Madati, Tanzania, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF POLLUTION CONTROL 309 (Edward J. Kormondy ed., 1989).
The situation in Tanzania may, in fact, be relatively mild. A recent study revealed that Thailand
had at least 70 environmentally related statutes; see Douglas L. Tookey, Southeast Asian Environ-
mentalism at its Crossroads: Learning Lessons from Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental
Law and Policy, II GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 313 (1999). Uganda is said to have over 25
major statutes and another 50 statutory instruments which deal with some aspect of the environment;
see KAMUGASHA, supra note 45, at 11. The historical evolution of environmental legislation in the
developing world is dealt with by Peigi Wilson et al., Emerging Trends in National Environmental
Legislation in Developing Countries, in UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD, supra note 34, at 189-91.
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ronment.49  After the Stockholm Conference, a number of countries be-
gan to enact legislation which dealt more directly with pollution and
other environmental problems.50 However, gaps often appear in this
legislation. 5' For example, water pollution may have been addressed
while hazardous waste or air pollution was ignored. Enforcement has
also proven problematic in many cases due to insufficient funding and
inadequate administrative capacity, especially in the field.52 Too often,
in fact, the newer pollution laws are not implemented53 or even under-
stood by those charged with administering the law.
54
The wide array of legislation - natural resource related as well pure
environmental law - also commonly involves large numbers of minis-
tries and other government offices. In Tanzania, two institutions have
primary responsibilities within the area of environmental management -
the National Environment Management Council and the Division of En-
vironment in the Office of the Vice President. With regard to water pol-
lution, however, statutory responsibilities have been given to the Central
Water Board and the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, as well as to the two
49. See LAUSCHE, supra note 47, at 16-17 (referring in part to the fact that many statutes lack im-
plementing regulations); see also Jonathan Rigg & Philip Stott, Forest Tales: Politics. Policy Mak-
ing, and the Environment in Thailand, in ECOLOGICAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 97 (describing the ineffective enforcement of a number of statutes
which were designed to protect Thailand's forests); Richard 0. Miller, Mining, Environmental Pro-
tection, and Sustainable Development in Indonesia, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 20,
at 325-326 (referring to the virtual lack of enforcement of various environmental protection provi-
sions in Indonesia).
50. See JOSE M. BORRERO NAVIA, ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER LAW IN THE SOUTH 107 (1994).
51. See Hitchcock, supra note 48, at 9; Lausche, supra note 47, at 16; D. B. OGOLA, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (Workshop on National Environ-
mental Legislation, Dares Salaam, Tanzania, Sept. 4-6, 1995) (on file with the author).
52. See Russell E. Train, Foreword, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 675, 677 (1985) (attributing "spotty and
ineffective" enforcement to administrative weakness and an inadequate field presence); Hitchcock,
supra note 48, at 9 (stating that "[e]nforcement bodies lack personnel, training and finances to en-
force the laws; when prosecutions do occur, existing penalties are low"); RAUL BRA9ES,
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 35, 70-71 (1991)
(linking enforcement problems with inadequate administrative capacity and funding shortages);
Leonard & Morrell, supra note 18, at 302 (referring to the relatively low budgetary priority that en-
vironmental programs have in many developing countries).
53. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 17; NEAP, supra note 48, at 42. Few water pollution permits
(consents), if any, have been issued, for example, under the 1981 water quality-related amendments
to the Tanzanian Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974 (Govt. Notice No. 42),
reprinted in UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF TOURISM,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 4 LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO ENVIRONMENT 1 (Feb.
1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter TANZANIAN ENVTL. LEGISLATION].
54. See NEAP, supra note 48, at 42 (stating that "most" statutes relating to environmental issues
"are not understood or currently enforced"). Too often developing nations have used statutes from
the developed world as models for their own legislation despite the fact that many those statutes are
too complex to be implemented in another context. See also Lausche, supra note 47, at 17-18 (also
pointing out that copies of new laws may not be widely available).
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ministries that are responsible for water and fisheries. Among the offices
responsible for protecting other environmental amenities are the Tanza-
nia National Parks Authority the Wildlife Division and the Forestry Divi-
sion in the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources the Ngorongoro
Conservation Area Authority and the National Land Use Planning Com-
mission. In addition, a large number of sectoral ministries make deci-
sions that implicate natural resources including the Ministry of Water,
Energy, and Minerals; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of
Lands, Housing and Urban Development; and the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce.
55
Elaborate legal and institutional frameworks are not unique to Tanza-
nia. Throughout the developing world, institutional arrangements are
often too complicated to be effective. In many instances, overlapping
and confusing grants of authority lead to bureaucratic competition over
jurisdiction, poor planning, and the inefficient utilization of scarce re-
sources. 56 Donor institutions often exacerbate these problems by funding
similar programs in rival agencies.57 These funding conflicts are not the
product of bad faith, but often result from institutional loyalties, histori-
cal connections, and personal ties that exist between donors and some
government agencies. Such conflicts and redundancies endure (and oth-
ers arise) because of the almost complete lack of coordinated planning
within the donor community. 58 While donors and recipients in some de-
veloping nations share information about on-going projects,5 9 seldom do
55. See G. L. Kamukala, Institutional Structures for Environmental Management in Tanzania 3-4,
Workshop on National Environmental Legislation (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Sept. 4-6, 1995) (on
file with the author). See also LEAT Report, supra note 48 (presenting a comprehensive discussion
of the complex institutional framework for environmental and natural resource management in Tan-
zania).
56. See KAMUGASHA, supra note 45, at 4; Borrero, supra note 50, at 291; Olusegun Areola, Com-
parative Environmental Issues and Policies in Nigeria, in ECOLOGICAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 248 (describing intense in-fighting between two govern-
ment agencies given responsibility for environmental management).
57. See, e.g., David Fairman & Michael Ross, Old Fads, New Lessons: Learning from Economic
Development Assistance, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID, supra note 43, at 46.
58. See id. at 45; Clement Dorm-Adzobu, Institutionalizing Environmental Management in Africa,
in AFRICA'S VALUABLE ASSETS, supra note 30, at 58. Underlying this lack of coordination are
"substantial conflicts of interest" between donors, between recipient agencies, and between donors
and recipients. Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 45. Donors, of course, compete with each other
for projects, publicity, and prestige, and recipients- collectively as well as individually- are often
able to gain by playing donors off one another. See id. at 45-47.
59. The donor community in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, formed an informal group on the environ-
ment which commonly gathered over lunch every month to hear speakers and discuss current devel-
opments. See generally Svantesson, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing the role of the Informal Donor
Group on the Environment (IDGE) in compiling a directory of current donor supported activities in
Tanzania); CUELLAR, supra note 34, at 16 (referring to the formation of this informal donor group in
1992); see also Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 45 (discussing how coordination is improved
when donors organize national roundtables or consultative groups, or when recipients have a cen-
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donors discuss strategic priorities with one another during the planning
process. Thus, funding decisions often promote institutional rivalries
and a patchwork of overlapping and inconsistent activities.
Consultants retained by a donor and commissioned by a government
body to review environmental and natural resource legislation with a
view to participating in the drafting of some new legislation are entering
a virtual mine field. Not only is the legal and cultural terrain complex,
but the institutional dynamics can be treacherous. Simply collecting the
necessary information can be a tremendous challenge since legal trea-
tises, government organization manuals, and compilations of relevant
law seldom exist or if they do, their existence is either unknown to the
consultant or, if known, almost impossible to find. All too often, con-
sultants will lack the time, the ability, or perhaps even the desire to accu-
rately assess the overlapping legal and institutional responsibilities ex-
isting within the government. 60 Thus, either advertently or inadvertently,
many proposed reforms will favor one or another institution, ministry or
donor - a fact that will not only doom the entire exercise to likely fail-
ure, but will produce even more cause for institutional distrust.6' Donors
and governments alike, moreover, may eventually grow weary of even
trying to craft appropriate laws and institutional structures.
For these reasons, successful law reform projects are not terribly
common. Reports and proposals are written by a seemingly endless
chain of consultants who often work in isolation, producing work lacking
continuity and destined to gather dust. One should not, however, grow
discouraged simply because such projects are difficult to design, imple-
ment, and sustain. 6' Recognizing the difficulties involved in the
tralized agency or process for reconciling aid with overall development objectives).
60. Not only is the work difficult and the necessary information hard to collect, but too many in-
ternational consultants are self-declared experts who lack appropriate legal experience and creden-
tials. Even in cases where they appear qualified, all too often they try to impose a "one-size fits all"
approach, either directly importing a Western statute without regard to local conditions, legal back-
ground, or capacity, or using some sort of uniform, pre-fabricated check list. Perhaps donors ought
to more often utilize the considerable talent which exists in the legal academy, many of whose mem-
bers appear to be both able and willing to do deliberate and well-considered work in the developing
world. See Sherif Omar Hassan, Remarks at the American Bar Association, Section of Legal Edu-
cation and Admissions to the Bar, Conference on Foreign Programs (Washington, D.C., Sept. 19,
1998) (commenting on the relative absence of law teachers in this arena).
61. Disgruntled ministries typically have a number of opportunities within the cabinet system to
attack legislative proposals which they dislike. If a ministry decides to move forward with a con-
sultant's recommendations, a cabinet report generally must be prepared and submitted to an inter-
ministerial committee for review. If approved, the paper will be sent to the entire cabinet for its con-
sideration. Only if the cabinet approves the proposal will it go forward in the parliamentary process.
See generally F. WEREMA, PROCESS OF DRAFTING ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 6 (Workshop on
National Environmental Legislation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Sept. 4-6, 1995) (describing the leg-
islative process in Tanzania) (on file with the author).
62. See Sherif Omar Hassan, supra note 60 (discussing some of the difficulties which typically
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strengthening of environmental law and institutions in the developing
world is, in fact, the first step toward devising more appropriate strate-
gies.
II. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
Ideally, a complete compilation and analysis of existing legislation, as
well as a review of current institutional arrangements, should be com-
pleted at an early stage in the development of a national environmental
policy or national conservation strategy. Such a legal analysis is neces-
sary in order to identify problems such as: outmoded statutes; inconsis-
tencies in approach; laws copied wholesale from developed countries
(during either the colonial or post-independence periods); obvious gaps
in coverage; the lack of implementing regulations; a paucity of adminis-
trative enforcement devices; the lack of normal civil enforcement
mechanisms such as civil penalties and injunctive relief; low monetary
penalties; and overly permissive variance provisions. The institutional
review, in turn, ought to explore whether there are problems with over-
lapping jurisdiction, lack of coordination between agencies and minis-
tries, and inadequate institutional capacity. These tasks, although easily
stated, are not always easily performed. Statutory materials are often not
codified, indices or code revisions may be unavailable or incomplete, and
sometimes, even in the libraries of high appellate courts, copying ma-
chines are not available for use by the public. Even when the necessary
documents are collected and reviewed and the existing governmental
structure is set forth on paper, the lawyer's task at this early stage is not
really complete.
One must also determine whether the laws are actually being imple-
mented, and, if so, whether fine-tuning is necessary. To make these de-
terminations effectively, one must do field work, conducting interviews
and touring relevant facilities accompanied and guided by appropriate
technical or scientific staff. In addition, any identified gaps in the current
regulatory structure must be examined and prioritized, at least tenta-
tively. For this purpose, thorough knowledge of the country and its envi-
ronmental problems, as well as existing law, are needed. Finally, the ca-
pacity of the nation's environmental and resource institutions should be
honestly and thoroughly evaluated - not just from reports, but also from
interviews and first-hand experience. A group of experts, therefore,
ought to review the relevant agencies on the basis of training, motivation,
resources, management capacity, and professional competence.63
confront law reform activities).
63. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 19 (listing a number of variables that have been found to affect
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This sort of interdisciplinary work may not be readily accepted in all
cultures. In some countries, the appropriate role of lawyers is perceived
narrowly. Lawyers are supposed to draft laws, for instance, but are not
intended to be involved in policymaking decisions or regulatory imple-
mentation.64 Such a view, of course, fails to appreciate the role of law as
a problem-solving activity and may contribute to a disjunction between
law and actual practice. Perhaps the best way to deal with such an atti-
tude is to try to demonstrate, by example, what lawyers can contribute to
environmental protection efforts when they work in collaborative fashion
with technical and policy specialists, as well as the public.65 The effort
to produce a complete picture of the legal, environmental, and institu-
tional status quo offers a fine opportunity to begin such a collaboration.
Such an analysis, however, is only the first step in the effort to inte-
grate coherently law and policy. Lawyers should participate fully in the
entire process of drafting or revising any policy document or conserva-
tion strategy to help ensure that the nation's basic environmental policy
statement will include proposals and priorities for strengthening the na-
tion's environmental legislation. Their participation is also essential to
help formulate proposals for restructuring, if necessary, the institutions
of government that deal with the protection of natural resources and the
environment.
Many countries have already formulated their basic environmental
policy documents.66 While the legal contribution to some may have been
scanty, in other cases, as in Tanzania, a great deal of contemporaneous
legal work67 has been done that informed the policy statements in a num-
ber of significant ways. 6  Nevertheless, most policy documents are
phrased at a fairly high level of generality when it comes to legislative
and institutional questions. So, although some general guidance may
exist, a more precise vision for legal and institutional reform will, in
institutional performance). In many instances, at least some of these experts could be recruited lo-
cally from, for example, the growing number of environmental and environmental law NGOs.
64. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 30, at 10,597-10,598 (discussing the limited role of law and lawyers
in Russian society); Jaro Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Pa-
rameters and Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997, 1008-1009 (1985) (relating how the training and
the outlook of many lawyers adversely affects their ability or even willingness to deal with scientific,
technical, or policy matters).
65. See Bell, supra note 30, at 10,598.
66. Most African nations, for example, have already prepared a national environmental plan or
strategy. See Peter G. Veit & Deanna M. Wolfire, Participatory Policy-Making and the Role of Lo-
cal Non-Governmental Organizations, in AFRICA'S VALUABLE ASSETS, supra note 30, at 158.
67. See, e.g., TANZANIAN ENVTL. LEGISLATION, supra note 53; HITCHCOCK, supra note 48.
68. See NAT'L CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 48, at 20, 25-28, 40-51, 56; NEAP, supra
note 48, at 42-44. Cf. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Dec. 1997) (on file with the author) (focusing almost exclusively on pol-
icy aspirations and containing little analysis of current laws or environmental conditions).
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most instances, have to be developed.69
This vision should include comprehensive proposals for legal and in-
stitutional change as well as proposals for sequencing those changes to
help ensure a coordinated approach while specific laws are drafted and
other reforms are implemented. Regardless of whether the effort to
fashion this comprehensive vision is undertaken during the development
of the national environmental policy or afterwards, it is vital that an in-
terdisciplinary team of experts first complete the necessary background
work. It is also vital that priorities be set and a plan of action established
at a fairly early stage in the planning process in order to allow for actual
drafting to proceed in consistent but gradual fashion. Such a process
should give the participating donors adequate time to coordinate and al-
locate specific funding responsibilities among themselves.7 °
During this planning process, the participants ought to be sensitive to
the regional nature of many environmental problems.71 Lake Victoria,
for example, is shared by three riparian states: Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda. Water quality in the lake has been seriously degraded by un-
treated municipal and industrial wastes and by pesticides and nutrients
that run off from nearby fields.72 The lake is also suffering from the loss
69. It is not uncommon for national environmental policy documents to call for substantial, peri-
odic reviews and updating. The Tanzanian National Environment Action Plan, for instance, envi-
sions a "major review" of its provisions every three years. NEAP, supra note 48, at 36. Some of
the policy documents, moreover, really ought to be completely redone. A number were produced in
great haste- primarily by outside experts- to meet donor-imposed deadlines. See Dorm-Adzobu,
supra note 58, at 47, 52-53 (referring, for example, to the World Bank's decision to make a NEAP a
condition precedent for receiving Intemational Development Association (IDA) credits).
70. The donors might want to consider establishing joint donor missions to coordinate this effort.
"Donor agencies would not surrender authority over decisions on the use of their aid to these [joint]
missions, but their representatives to them would have authority to commit aid funds to agreed ac-'
tivities provided those activities were in accord with the broad policies and regulatory requirements
of their agencies." LANCASTER, supra note 21, at 234-35. If the donors choose not to go this far,
then they should at least organize a national roundtable or consultative group to coordinate their
funding of the plan of action.
71. In addition to dozens of lakes which are shared by at least two states, there are some 214 river
basins which are multinational. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, SAVING OUR
PLANET: CHALLENGES AND HOPES 36 (1992).
72. See Di Leva, International Environmental Law and Development, supra note 36 at 516; LAKE
VICTORIA ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME: PROPOSALS OF NATIONAL WORKING
GROUP II (TANZANIA) ON MANAGEMENT OF WATER QUALITY AND LAND USE, INCLUDING
WETLANDS 1-2, 7-48 (June 1995) (on file with the author). The sewage and other nutrients which
enter the lake have stimulated the growth of algae as well the proliferation of the water hyacinth.
When the algae and water hyacinth decompose, they deplete the dissolved oxygen content in many
areas of the lake- leading to anaerobic conditions and massive fish kills. See Rafik Hirji & David
Grey, Managing International Waters in Africa: Process and Progress, in INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES: ENHANCING COOPERATION AND MANAGING CONFLICT 86 (Salman M. A. Salman
& Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes eds., 1998) (World Bank Technical Paper No. 414) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES].
The most widely used organochlorine pesticides in the Lake basin are dieldrin and aldrin., see id.
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of adjacent wetlands, the disappearance of native species, and the intro-
duction of exotic species like the Nile Tilapia and the carnivorous Nile
Perch.73 As a shared resource whose problems are traceable to actions
and inaction in all three countries, Lake Victoria underscores the need,
that often exists for regional cooperation and regional solutions.74 Those
who are responsible for analyzing pollution problems and setting priori-
ties for legal reform ought, therefore, to be aware of these special cases
and the need in many instances to harmonize regulation among the im-
pacted states.
III. LEGAL REFORM: SOME EARLY STEPS
A. Choosing an Overall Legislative Strategy
At an early stage, the participants in the planning process will have to
address a basic question: what path should environmental law reform
follow in this particular country? Should specific pieces of sectoral leg-
islation be developed or amended to address all major environmental
problems such as water pollution, hazardous waste, wildlife, forests,
mining, and fisheries? Or should a less traditional approach be taken,
perhaps a comprehensive environmental statute which attempts to cover
all or virtually all environmental matters? Or should a middle road be
pursued resulting in a framework statute that can address a number of
overarching matters such as environmental rights and policy while leav-
ing most matters to be dealt with through sectoral legislation?
Each approach poses advantages and disadvantages. A strict sectoral
approach regulates pollution and polluting activities in basically a media-
specific way (air, water, groundwater, land) and is an approach utilized
in the United States.75 It has certain advantages for the law reformer.
One might, for example, be able to build upon the existing legal regime
at 25, pesticides whose use has been banned or severely restricted in the United States for decades.
See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES: EPA'S UPDATE 117-118 (1988).
73. See Rafik Hirji & David Grey, Managing International Waters in Africa: Process and Prog-
ress, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 72, at 85-86.
74. With the support of the World Bank, the states bordering Lake Victoria signed a tripartite
agreement in 1994 pledging to work toward the implementation of a joint plan to rejuvenate and
protect the second largest body of freshwater in the world. Lake Victoria Environmental Manage-
ment Programme, Agreement on the Preparation of a Tripartite Environmental Management Pro-
gramme for Lake Victoria, August 5, 1994; see Di Leva, Int. Envtl. Law and Dev., supra note 36, at
516. Unfortunately, the nations involved in the Lake Victoria Management Programme appear to be
working more in isolation than in collaboration with each other.
75. See William L. Andreen, The Evolving Law of Environmental Protection in the United States:
1970-1991, 9 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 96, 98-102, 103-105 (1992).
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and the existing bureaucratic structure rather than striking out into un-
charted territory. Thus, not only can reform perhaps be more efficiently
engineered, but resistance within the government and regulated commu-
nity may be lower. On the other hand, the more fragmented approach
presented by media-specific laws creates complexity, making the regu-
latory structure difficult to understand, expensive to comply with, and
awkward to enforce. In addition, a strict sectoral approach often ignores
cross-media pollution problems (situations where, for example, the best
water pollution controls produce serious solid waste problems) and ren-
ders cross-sectoral coordination difficult.7 6 Another common criticism of
a sectoral approach is the fact that it is nearly impossible for the govern-
ment to set rational priorities among different programs when the pro-
grams are driven by different statutory mandates."
As a result, there has been a move in the western world toward more
integrated approaches to pollution control or, at least, to better coordina-
tion among programs. Perhaps the most holistic of such approaches is
often referred to in the development literature as a "comprehensive" or
"omnibus" statute.79 Such a statute would certainly simplify regulation
- at least in theory - by setting forth some common strategies and
management structures, rather than governing each sector in a potentially
different way. It would also present an opportunity to deal with cross-
media pollution transfers in a more direct and effective manner, as well
as offering a perhaps more efficient way to deal with compliance and en-
forcement issues.80 To an American lawyer, however, the notion of
crafting a single statute to deal with all pollution problems seems like a
virtually impossible task. In the United States, there are command-and-
control statutes like the Clean Water Act8' and the Clean Air Act;82 li-
ability-forcing statutes like the Comprehensive Environmental Response,_
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as Superfund);
83
76. See Faith Halter, Toward More Effective Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries,
in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 223, 231 (Denizhan Erocal ed.,
OECD 1991).
77. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES:
EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 16-19 (1998) (discussing the negative consequences of a sectoral ap-
proach); William K. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 355 (1989)
(advocating a broader, more integrated approach to environmental law).
78. See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 77, at 18-19, 220-222. At a minimum, lawyers and pro-
gram officers from other media programs ought to be consulted whenever a rulemaking or other
agency action has the potential to adversely affect another media area.
79. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 17; Hitchcock, supra note 48, at 12; Wilson et al., supra note
48, at 194-95.
80. See Wilson et al., supra note 48, at 195.
81.33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
82.42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (q) (1994).
83.42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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and information forcing statutes like the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act." There are also health-based regulations,
8 5
technology-based regulations, 6 and regulations based upon an explicit
balancing of harm versus cost8 7 and risk. 8  The US experience, moreo-
ver, suggests that the best approach to environmental regulation involves
a mixture of strategies, using the best one for the task at hand.89 Thus, it
is not irrational at all for a system to combine a number of traditional
command-and-control strategies" with some more modem incentive
strategies such as strict liability, information-forcing, tradable emission
limits, or various tax schemes. Perhaps the greatest problem with a com-
prehensive approach, however, is the political one - too many interests
in the government and in industry have too large a stake in the present
sectoral approach to jettison everything and start all over. In most in-
stances, therefore, a truly comprehensive approach will simply not be
feasible.
A more realistic response to the need for a more integrated approach to
environmental management is a "framework" or "umbrella" statute.
91
Framework legislation has proven very popular in the developing
world. 92 It generally lays down some basic principles often based upon
the national environmental policy and also dealing with planning and
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 -11050 (1994).
85. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(bX1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(bXl) (national primary ambient air
quality standards).
86. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (new source performance standards); Clean
Water Act § 301(b)(l)(A), (bX2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(IXA), (b)(2) (technology-based effluent
limitations).
87. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (a) (1994).
88. Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
89. See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190.
90. Despite all of the criticism which has been directed at command-and-control regulation (see,
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1334-40 (1985) (criticizing the BAT (Best Available Technology) regulatory system, a type of
command and control regulatory scheme)), command-and-control strategies are likely to be more
efficient in terms of administrative costs, at least initially, than schemes involving emissions trading.
See Percival, supra note 89, at 176; Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Manage-
ment Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 21-24. Command-and-control schemes
have also produced dramatic improvements in environmental quality. See Stoddard et al., Progress
in Water Quality: An Evaluation of the Environmental and Economic Benefits of the 1972 Clean
Water Act, in 1998 WATER ENV'T FED'N PROc. 84 (May 3-6, 1998, Denver) (discussing the effi-
ciency of the Clean Water Act) (on file with the author); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND
EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 1989 at 1-14 (1991) (reporting significant decreases in the emissions of
several air pollutants between 1970 and 1989: a drop of 96 percent in lead, a decline of 61 percent
total suspended particulates, a fall of 26 percent in sulphur oxide, a decrease of 40 percent in carbon
monoxide, and a reduction of31 percent in volatile organic compounds).
91. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 17.
92. See Kaniaru et al., supra note 35, at 161.
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policy formulation. Framework statutes may also contain structures for
environmental management to aid, for example, in cross-media coordi-
nation or to help resolve environmental disputes.93 Other typical provi-
sions deal with public participation, access to environmental information,
and environmental impact assessment.94 In some cases, the framework
legislation goes even further and grants certain government agencies the
authority to address specific environmental issues.95  It may even
authorize the reorganization of all the pollution control activities in the
government.
The biggest advantage of a framework statute lies in its flexibility.
Certain common matters can be addressed in one piece of legislation and
even new agencies can be created to help coordinate government action,
while reserving most sectoral legislation and media-specific pollution
96laws for separate treatment. 96 It can thus be melded to the realities of a
particular situation, taking advantage of sectoral expertise where it exists
(thus lowering hostility to change in the process) and providing a way to
address a number of systemic issues.
B. Effective Environmental Impact Assessment
Regardless of which overall statutory approach is taken, one piece of
legislation ought to be singled out for early adoption or, perhaps, revision
- environmental impact assessment (EIA).97 Whether as a separate bill,
part of a comprehensive statute, or a principal component of a framework
structure, EIA should be a top priority because it can, when properly de-
signed and implemented, be the single most effective device for recon-
ciling development with the principles of sustainability. It institutional-
izes caution and foresight by compelling actors to look at possible
impacts and reasonable alternatives before it is too late and resources
have been irretrievably committed to a particular project in a way that
may cause irreparable harm.98 In essence, EIA tries to actually change
93. See id.; Hitchcock, supra note 48, at 12; see also DAVID O'CONNOR, MANAGING THE
ENVIRONMENT WITH RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 72
(1994) (addressing the standard approach in East Asia to crafting a framework statute); Tookey, su-
pra note 48, at 314-315 (describing Thailand's environmental framework statute).
94. See Wilson et al., supra note 48, at 194.
95. See id. In some commentaries, however, the line between framework statutes and comprehen-
sive statutes becomes more than a little confused- perhaps because the authors want to encourage
those inclined toward framework statutes to draft more and more comprehensive statutes. See id. at
194-195.
96. See O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 72.
97. Although a number of developing countries have already enacted EIA legislation, the effec-
tiveness of the EIA procedures that are on the books often leaves a great deal to be desired. See id.
at 73, 156.
98. See Andreen, supra note 75, at 98.
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the way in which people approach development by injecting environ-
mental considerations at an early stage in the decision-making process.
EIA legislation, in short, is a crucial component of any effective envi-
ronmental management strategy. It applies to all sectors of the govern-
ment (including ministries dealing with mining and forests, as well as the
other mission-oriented ministries) in an effort to inject environmental
concerns into all relevant government decision-making. In doing so, EIA
brings into the open for comment and scrutiny many decisions which too
often have been made behind closed doors. Thus, EIA allows for the
possibility of better government coordination across sectoral lines.
The first statute in the world to require the assessment of environ-
mental impacts in proposed actions was the United States' National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).99 The Act began with a lofty
declaration of national policy providing that "it is the continuing policy
of the Federal Government. .. to use all practicable means ... to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in pro-
ductive harmony ... "'0o Congress understood, however, that an elo-
quent policy statement, standing alone, would have little impact upon the
real world unless some additional action-forcing features were added. So
Congress ordered federal agencies to comply "to the fullest extent possi-
ble" with two new mandates.' 0 ' First, all agencies were directed to apply
their laws, policies and regulations in accordance with the national policy
set forth in NEPA,10 2 thus amending, in effect, the organic statutes of
every agency in the federal government. Second, all agencies were re-
quired to produce "a detailed statement" for federal actions "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."' 03 Such state-
ments were to analyze all feasible alternatives, including the proposed
action, and consider the environmental effects of each.'04
99. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1994). For thorough treatments of NEPA, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
800-970 (2d ed. 1994); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (1993); LYNTON K.
CALDWELL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: REDIRECTING POLICY
THROUGH PROCEDURAL REFORM (1982); Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy
Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990); William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's
Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND.
L.J. 205 (1989).
100. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. 4331(a) (1994).
101. NEPA § 102,42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
102. NEPA § 102(1),42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1994).
103. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
104. Id. NEPA, therefore, appears to be one of the original legal manifestations of the principles
of prevention and precaution. The principle of prevention provides that the environment is best
served by prudent planning which seeks to prevent environmental harm in the first place, rather than
trying to remedy the harm after it occurs. See WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT art. 6 (1995) [hereinafter IUCN
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NEPA, therefore, tries to achieve cognitive change - reforming the
way we view development - through a procedural device: the impact
statement. The effectiveness of this approach is strengthened by the
creation of several institutional arrangements that help to reinforce the
notion of sustainability. First, NEPA creates a Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President to oversee
the implementation of the Act.'0 5 In addition, the Act calls upon those
agencies preparing impact statements to obtain comments from any other
agency that has jurisdiction or special expertise over the matter. ' 6 Fi-
nally, Congress ordered the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to: (1) review and comment on the environmental consequences
of any federal actions requiring an impact statement; 0 7 and (2) refer to
CEQ any action which EPA finds to be "unsatisfactory from the stand-
point of public health or welfare or environmental quality." 
08
Based on NEPA's original example, environmental impact assessment
has evolved into one of the most utilized methods worldwide for helping
decision-makers understand and heed the environmental ramifications of
their actions. Today, at least 60 nations have adopted an EIA process in
some form, whether by legislation, regulation, or informal policy pro-
nouncement.' °9 In addition, many states and provinces in federal systems
DRAFT COVENANT]. The precautionary principle suggests that governments should try to look
ahead and protect public health and the environment from possible serious or irreversible damage,
even in the absence of complete certainty regarding the threat of harm. See Rio DECLARATION, su-
pra note 25, princ. 15; IUCN Draft Covenant, supra, art. 7. For a further look at the precautionary
principle, see Lothar Gandling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precaution, 5
INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 23 (1990); Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle:
Environmental Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495
(1995).
105. NEPA § 202,42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1994).
106. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1994). These comments, plus the impact state-
ment itself, must be made available to CEQ and the public. Id.
107. Clean Air Act § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1994). This provision was enacted shortly after
the passage of NEPA and was intended "to create an advocate within the government who would
blow the whistle on harmful environmental actions." Andreen, supra note 99, at 229. NEPA thus
seeks to effect cognitive reform- a reorientation in the way relevant actors think- through a com-
bination of procedural and structural reforms. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Re-
form and the Positive State: An Historical Overview, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 399, 400 (1986) (exploring
the anatomy of administrative reform by focusing on four specific strategies: substantive reform,
cognitive reform, procedural reform, and structural reform).
108. Clean Air Act § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1994).
109. See Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19
ENVTL. AFF. 591, 611-616 (1992) (listing 41 countries with EIA procedures); MOHAMMED A.
BEKHECHI & JEAN-ROGER MERCIER, COMPENDIUM AND ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION OF SELECTED SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 5-6 (1998 draft)
(listing an additional 19 African nations which have adopted some form of EIA since 1991). For an
exploration of regional differences in the design and implementation of EIA, see INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE: LAW AND PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCE (Envtl. Law Network Int'l ed., 1997).
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like Australia, Canada, and the United States have also enacted EIA pro-
grams. 10
EIA was also recognized as an essential method for protecting the in-
tegrity of the global environment at UNCED. Principle 17 of the Rio
Declaration provides that "[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a na-
tional instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are
likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are
subject to a decision of a competent national authority." I" In an effort
to convert many such "soft" principles into binding international law
and to reinforce the consensus on a number of basic legal norms, the
World Conservation Union's (IUCN) Commission on Environmental
Law, in cooperation with the International Council of Environmental
Law, proposed the contents of a draft International Covenant on Envi-
ronm ent and Development in 1995.112 Recognizing EIA as a tool for
complying with both the notions of precaution and prevention, Article 37
of the Draft Covenant calls for the establishment or strengthening of EIA
procedures. Hence the international community, as well as highly quali-
fied publicists, have apparently accepted the logic behind environmental
assessment." 13 The challenge lies in its implementation.
110. See Robinson, supra note 109, at 611-612, 616. For more discussion of the mini-NEPAs
which have been adopted in 15 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, see MANDELKER, supra
note 99, at 12-1 through 12-78. For a brief review of Canadian provincial and Australian state EIA
provisions, see ALAN GILPIN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA): CUTTING EDGE FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 113-114, 124-129 (1995) and Constance D. Hunt, A Note on Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment in Canada, 20 ENvTL. L. 789, 790-793 (1990). More thorough treat-
ment of the EIA processes in the Australian states can be found in GERRY M. BATES,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 93-125 (3d ed. 1992). A number of international lending or-
ganizations have also instituted environmental assessment procedures. See, e.g., WORLD BANK,
OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.01: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (Oct. 1991).
111. Rio DECLARATION, supra note 25 (emphasis added). While the Rio Declaration is only "soft
law" and not a statement of binding international law, such documents have exercised significant
influence on international and domestic environmental action. See Boer, supra note 39, at 307-308.
As Bimie and Boyle have written:
Such guidelines and norms manifest general consent to certain basic principles that are accept-
able and practicable for both developed and developing countries. To this extent, if followed
by state practice, they can provide evidence of the opiniojuris from which new customary laws
and principles develop, and, whilst permitting diversity, contribute to harmonization of envi-
ronmental law and standards at the global level.
Supra note 18, at 30. The Stockholm Declaration, in fact, has been often cited as the source of mod-
ern environmental law. See, e.g., ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 36-42 (1991).
112. IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, supra note 104; see Nicholas A. Robinson, IUCN's Proposed
Covenant on Environment and Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 133 (1995) (discussing the
origin of the draft covenant).
113. Many countries have turned to international instruments to guide the development of their
own policies and laws. See Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1503,1509 (1999).
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1. Uniting Policy and Procedure to Influence Decision-making
The impact statement or assessment is not an end in itself, but a means
to produce better substantive decisions. The ultimate purpose of EIA,
after all, "is not to generate paperwork, even excellent paperwork, rather
to foster excellent action." 114 For this reason, it would be appropriate to
combine new or revised EIA legislation with a concise, statutory decla-
ration of national environmental policy that would become part of the
operating mandate of every single government office and ministry.
Henceforth, it would be the specific obligation of each arm of govern-
ment to balance their more immediate social and economic policies with
the "developmental and environmental needs of present and future gen-
erations." it5 The resulting legislation (policy, plus EIA process) could
be enacted in separate form, or it could form the centerpiece of either a
framework or comprehensive statute. In any case, it should be a top leg-
islative priority since it is such a useful device for integrating environ-
mental protection into the development process.16
2. The Threshold Question
The threshold question in any EIA process involves the issue of
whether a full EIA must be prepared for a particular action. Under both
the Rio Declaration and the IUCN Draft Covenant, the test is whether the
activity is: (1) subject to a decision by a competent national authority and
(2) likely to have a significant adverse impact upon the environment."
7
Actions subject to a decision by a competent national authority would
include governmental activities such as building roads, dams, and irriga-
tion schemes. Private actions that depend on government approval such
as planning permits, pollution permits, or development approvals would
also be included. While "significant adverse impact" is not defined by
either the Rio Declaration or the IUCN Draft Covenant, the CEQ regula-
tions state that NEPA requires consideration of both intensity (the sever-
ity of impact including cumulatively significant impacts) and context
(the setting of the action, including short and longer-term effects)." 8
114. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1999) (NEPA regulations promulgated by the U.S. Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality).
115. Rio DECLARATION, supra note 25, princ. 3.
116. See id. princ. 4 (providing that "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of
the development process").
117. See RiO DECLARATION, supra note 25, princ. 17; IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, supra note 104,
at 119 (commentary on art. 37- referring to public activities and private actions requiring govern-
ment approval). NEPA requires that Environmental Impact Statements be prepared on proposals for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." NEPA §
102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
118. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1999). These regulations also stress that in examining intensity one
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This rather vague definition of significance vests government minis-
tries with a great deal of discretion. Occasionally, a government ministry
or official may be tempted to avoid delay or possible embarrassment or
to help a fiend by simply declaring that a particular project will have no
significant adverse impact upon the environment. A number of methods
have been developed to cabin this discretion.
One way is to mandate the production of an EIA in certain instances.
Many nations have promulgated lists (often as a statutory annex) that
designate the kinds of projects that require EIAs." 9 EIAs, for example,
could be automatically triggered by large construction projects or pro-
posals with major land requirements. Such lists must be carefully devel-
oped for there is a natural tendency to list only large-scale actions and
thereby limit the application of EIA to large projects. 20  The rationale
behind such limits seems to make sense (at first blush at least) since they
assist nations with limited resources to target their EIAs on problems
which generally present more potential for harm.' 2' Many small projects,
however, may present grave problems - a small parking lot in the midst
of a historic district (such as Stone Town in Zanzibar); a relatively small
irrigation scheme that may destroy a productive wetland; or one more
tourist hotel, however modest, which may irrevocably alter the nature of
a coral coast. At the same time, many larger projects (such as another
major office building or a large parking lot in an already developed and
modem downtown area) may pose only nominal impact. The question is
really one of environmental significance and not the amount of money
involved so that significance should be driven by the context of the pro-
posal and the severity of the impact within that context. 22  Thus, the
problem with lists is that they can all too easily be both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive.
should consider whether the action is related to other proposals "with individually insignificant but
cumulatively significant impacts." Id. § 1508.27(b)(7). A developer or government entity, further-
more, should not be allowed to avoid significance by breaking an action down into a series of"small
component parts." See id.
119. See Robinson, supra note 109, at 596; Marceil Yeater & Lal Kurukulasuriya, Environmental
Impact Assessment Legislation in Developing Countries, in UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD, supra
note 34, at 262.
120. See Robinson, supra note 109, at 596.
121. See Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 262.
122. Although NEPA speaks in terms of a "major Federal action," the CEQ regulations state that
"'[m]ajor' reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of 'significantly."' 40 C.F.R. §
1508.18 (1999). See also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-
1322 (8"' Cir. 1974) (declaring that "to separate the consideration of the magnitude of the Federal
action from its impact on the environment does little to foster the purposes of the Act .... [I]f the
action has a significant effect it is the intent of NEPA that it should be the subject of the detailed
consideration mandated by NEPA ...."); FREDERICK ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 90 (1973)
(stating that "it makes little sense to find a project minor when its effects are significant").
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An alternate approach is to presume that EIA procedures apply to any
proposed action. The presumption may only be rebutted by showing that
the action fits into a category of actions that have been previously ex-
cluded from coverage. 123 This is called a "categorical exclusion" under
the U.S. CEQ regulations. 24 If a proposal is not categorically excluded,
an agency has two options. It may either proceed to prepare a full EIA
(called an Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS) or it may prepare a
less detailed document (called an Environmental Assessment, or EA) to
help it decide whether a proposal requires an EIS. An EA is really a
mini-EIS in which an agency addresses the need for the proposal, rea-
sonable alternatives, and the environmental impacts of the alternatives,
as well as the proposal. 25 Based on the EA, an agency is then expected
to either engage in the full EIS process or issue a Finding Of No Signifi-
cant Impact (FONSI). While agencies have considerable discretion in
issuing FONSIs, EAs are subject to public as well as agency comment
and the EPA can refer FONSIs to the CEQ.' 26 Adversely affected or ag-
grieved persons can challenge a FONSI and the EA upon which it is
predicated in federal court.
27
The American approach, while more sophisticated and more precise
than a system based upon a list of projects, 28 is resource intensive. EAs
outnumber EISs by a ratio of about 100 to 1. In a year like 1994 in
which 532 EISs were written, 129 there must have been approximately
123. See Mark Squillace, An American Perspective on Environmental Impact Assessment in Aus-
tralia, 20 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 43,75 (1995).
124. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1999). The CEQ regulations, however, require agency procedures
to "provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a sig-
nificant environmental effect." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1999). Categorical exclusions, moreover, have
been subject to judicial review. See Alaska Survival v. Weeks, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20949 (D. Alaska 1982) (invalidating categorical exclusion for herbicide spraying along the right-of-
way of the Alaska Railroad).
125. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1999). Agencies are directed to involve environmental agencies and the
public in the preparation of EAs. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
126. See Clean Air Act § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1994).
127. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (early case reviewing an
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS). In 1994, EAs were attacked as inadequate in 28 filed
cases. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 545
(1994-1995) (the failure to prepare an EA was challenged in 13 cases and the failure to prepare an
EIS was challenged in an additional 31 cases) [hereinafter CEQ 1994-1995 ANNIVERSARY REPORT];
Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on "Old" Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 10,060, 10,064 (1989) (the most litigated NEPA issue is whether a particular
proposal is likely to produce a significant environmental impact, thus necessitating the preparation of
an EIS).
128. Professor Nick Robinson claims that "experience suggests that the use of lists as a threshold
is evidence of an immature EIA process in which resort to a clear rule of thumb is preferable to a
more sophisticated and initially open analysis based on scientific data." Robinson, supra note 109,
at 596.
129. See id. at 534.
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50,000 EAs produced. Thus a somewhat simpler screening technique
may well be appropriate for many developing countries. Perhaps the best
technique would be one that combines the two basic approaches. One
such technique is used in Australia's New South Wales. The New South
Wales Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 sets forth a
schedule of developments which, because they generally have a signifi-
cant environmental impact, trigger the preparation of an EIS.' 30 Any pro-
posal, however, can still require an EIS if it is likely to have a significant
environmental effect. 3' Another variant is posed by the European
Council Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private works on the environment. It divides projects into two catego-
ries: (1) those for which EIA is required, and (2) those which ought to
receive close review to determine if, in the present instance, they pose
significant impacts for the environment.
32
The lists, however, would have to be crafted with immense care and
ought to include sensitive environmental areas (such as wetlands, coastal
areas and critical habitat), parks and reserves, areas with particular his-
toric, aesthetic, or cultural value, and areas that already suffer from
problems such as deforestation, severe erosion, or desertification,' 33 in
addition to the more typical list of public and private activities. Moreo-
ver, some sort of screening process, properly noticed, documented, and
made available for public and agency comment, ought to be devised to
determine if an unlisted activity, an activity slated for an unlisted area, a
legislative proposal, such as a new forestry law, land tenure reform, or
another government policy initiative, actually poses a significant risk of
harm to the environment. 34 Without such a screening process and with-
out some sort of oversight (whether administrative, judicial or both) a
great many significant actions will simply avoid serious scrutiny.
3. Timing
According to the IUCN Draft Covenant, the evaluation of significant
activities must take place before any approvals are issued. 13  That, of
130. See Squillace, supra note 123, at 75 (referring to 1979 N.S.W. Stat. No. 203 (1979) and
Designated Development, 1980 N.S.W.R. Regs. & B. 1142 (1980)).
131. See id. at 75, n.146.
132. See GILPIN, supra note 110, at 74-75; LUDWIG KRAMER, EEC TREATY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 16-17 (1990).
133. See IUCN Draft Covenant, supra note 104, at 120 (commentary to art. 37 referring to a num-
ber of statutes which take this approach- if an activity adversely affects the area or increases the
problem, it will be deemed significant); Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 262.
134. One possible way to inject more integrity into the screening process is to direct an environ-
mental arm ofgovemment to assist the action ministry in carrying out its screening. See Hunt, supra
note 110, at 795 (elaborating on the federal environmental assessment process in Canada).
135. See IUCN Draft Covenant, supra note 104, at art. 37(1).
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course, is logical for otherwise the assessment process might become a
mere post-hoc rationalization for previously made decisions. It would be
wise, in fact, to start the EIA process as soon as a governmental office
begins to formulate or is presented with a proposal so that the process as




An EIA should discuss all reasonable alternatives to a proposed course
of action, including the alternative of no action. 37 In addition, an EIA
should set forth the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts for all
of the alternatives, including the preferred alternative, in comparative
form so as to give the decision-maker, as well as the legislature and the
public, an opportunity to compare the advantages and disadvantages of
all possible courses of action. 38  The impacts from indirect effects as
well as direct effects should be addressed 139 Indirect effects may be de-
fined as those which are caused by the action, but occur later in time or
are removed in distance. 40  Examples would include "growth inducing
effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land
use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and wa-
ter and other natural systems, including ecosystems." 41 An EIA should
also consider cumulative impacts,'42 or the effect on the environment
when the proposed action is viewed in conjunction with past, present or
reasonably foreseeable projects. 143 A significant loss of wildlife habitat
occasioned by numerous timber sales would be a classic illustration of a
cumulative impact, as would the stream siltation caused by multiple
136. The CEQ NEPA regulations provide that an agency ought to start preparing an EIS "as close
as possible" to the time the agency begins to prepare or is presented with a proposal. 40 C.F.R. §
1502.5 (1999). After all, the NEPA process is intended to help government officials "make deci-
sions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect,
restore, and enhance the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1999).
137. See IUCN Draft Covenant, supra note 104, art. 37(2)(b); Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra
note 119, at 264; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)-(d) (1999) (CEQ NEPA regulations).
138. See Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 264; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14, 1502.16 (1999).
139. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a), (b) (1999).
140. See id. §1508.8. CEQ goes on to state that "[i]ndirect effects may include growth inducing
effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density or
growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems."
Id. § 1508.8(b).
141. Id.
142. See id. § 1508.25(c)(3); Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F.Supp. 1360 (D. Md.
1973); DRAFT IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(2)(a) (providing that an EIA must include
an evaluation of the "cumulative, long-term, indirect, long-distance, and transboundary effects").
143.40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1999).
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mining operations.' 44 The analysis of impacts (whether direct, indirect,
or cumulative) ought not to be strictly limited to ecological effects, but
should also include any relevant historic, cultural, aesthetic, economic,
social, or health effects 145 in order to present a comprehensive picture of
the proposal's impact upon the "human environment."
Another key component of an EIA is an evaluation of appropriate
mitigation measures. 146 According to the Draft IUCN Covenant, mitiga-
tion involves ways in which potential adverse effects can be either
averted or minimized. 147 The U.S. CEQ regulations are more detailed,
providing that mitigation can also involve, among other things: ways in
which the affected environment can be repaired, restored, or rehabili-
tated; ways in which the impact can be reduced through preservation or
maintenance operations during the life of the action; and compensation
for the impact through the replacement or substitution of resources or
environments. In order to help inform the necessary decision-maker
about the kind of measures that should be required as a condition of ap-
proval, the EIA ought to discuss mitigation in rather specific terms -
namely, what measures can be taken to avoid, minimize, remediate, or
compensate harm.
149
5. Objectivity in the Drafting of EIAs: Should Private Sector
Proponents Prepare the Document?
Professor Mark Squillace has argued that the EIA process is more ef-
fective when it occurs in an atmosphere of neutrality towards a particular
proposed action.'5° If handled properly, an EIA may allay or at least re-
duce the fears and suspicions that individuals in the community may har-
bor about a particular proposed development. A good EIA and a good
process are useful tools in trying to build public support for an action.
On the other hand, if the process appears biased or the outcome appears
predetermined, the public will most likely lose confidence in the EIA and
144. RODGERS, supra note 99, at 950.
145.40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1999).
146. See id. §§ 1502.14(0, 1502.16(h); Draft IUCN Covenant, supra note 104, art. 37(2)(c);
Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 264.
147. DRAFT IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(2)(c).
148. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1999).
149. Such a discussion will also help the agency as well as the public and other parts of the gov-
emnment to better evaluate the severity of the adverse impacts posed by a particular action. See Rob-
ertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). The Supreme Court, however,
also held that while mitigation had to be discussed in "sufficient detail," " [i]t would be inconsistent
with NEPA's reliance on procedural mechanisms- as opposed to substantive, result-based stan-
dards- to demand the presence of a fully developed plan that will mitigate environmental harm be-
fore an agency can act." Id.
150. Squillace, supra note 123, at 71.
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support for the venture itself may well vanish.'
It is a common practice in many countries (including developing
countries) to allow the private proponent of a project or a consultant that
it hires to prepare the EIA. 5 2 Such an approach appears flawed. Com-
panies will only start the EIS process once they have formulated a spe-
cific proposal that needs government approval. Since most companies
will act in their own self-interest most of the time, one can be confident
that the EIA will focus primarily on what the proponent wants to do.'
5 3
It would make little sense for a proponent of a new industrial facility to
be located in a particular place (perhaps on property the proponent al-
ready owns) to analyze fairly alternative locations and conclude that an-
other site would be superior from an environmental perspective.15 4 Pro-
ponent-prepared EIA's, in short, resemble a stacked deck which will
undermine "public confidence by removing any pretense that the
evaluation of the proposed action will be objective... The point is that
most rational people will necessarily be highly skeptical about the objec-
tivity of an EIS prepared by the project's proponent or its paid consult-
ant." 55  Despite its defects, this approach may be popular because gov-
ernments are concerned about bearing the costs associated with preparing
EIA documents for private sector proposals. There is no reason, how-
151. Id. at 101.
152. See GILPIN, supra note 109, at 22; Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 264; Squil-
lace, supra note 123, at 101 (looking at the Australian EIA process).
153. See Squillace, supra note 123, at 83; see generally O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 156 (stating
that in a number of East Asian countries "EIA requirements have come to be viewed by developers
as a mere formality that rarely results in substantial modification of project design").
154. See Squillace, supra note 123, at 89; Robinson, supra note 109, at 597-98. In many countries
which allow proponent-prepared EIAs, the proponent is required to consult with the government for
some initial guidance on the content and scope of the assessment. This consultation commonly re-
suits in the issuance of Terms of Reference (TOR) which sets forth the stipulated contents of the
EIA. See Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 263; GILPIN, supra note 110, at 20. Many
TORs, however, resemble nothing more than a rudimentary checklist or a table of contents, and even
a more elaborate one could not force a reluctant proponent to assess alternatives in a fair and open
manner. See generally GILPIN, supra note 110, at 20 (containing an example of a TOR issued by the
Office of the National Environmental Board of Thailand). It may possible, however, to mitigate this
problem to some extent by creating a system that entails a more active role by an environmental
agency in the planning and execution of the EIA. See Joseph de Pencier, The Federal Environ-
mental Assessment Process: A Practical Comparison of the EARP Guidelines Order and the Cana-
dian Environmental Assessment Act, 4 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 330, 341-43 (1993); Michael 1. Jeffery,
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 24 URB. LAW. 775, 782-786 (1992); Robinson, supra
note 109, at 599-600 (discussing the EIA process in Quebec).
155. Squillace, supra note 123, at 101-102. The consultant, after all, does not want to lose a client
by failing to produce a favorable report on the client's proposal. See also Gilpin, supra note 110, at
22-23 (while acknowledging serious problems with proponent-prepared EIAs, argues that an incen-
tive exists for "better, franker" documents since they often receive more timely development ap-
proval from the government- particularly in jurisdictions where public hearings or public inquiries
are available and where third persons have the right to judicially challenge an inadequate document).
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ever, why the private party proponents should not bear the costs incurred
by the government in preparing the EIA.1
56
In the United States, this problem has been largely avoided. The CEQ
rules prohibit the preparation of an EIS by a private party proponent or
by any person who may have an interest, financial or otherwise, in the
outcome of a project. 5 7 While private proponents may submit environ-
mental information documents,"'5 they cannot assess the environmental
ramifications of their proposed activities. In order to avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety the EIS, will be prepared by the agency that is vested
with the decision making. 59 Of course, the agency may hire a consultant
to perform the actual work, but only if the consultant has no conflict of
interest. 6° An agency, on the other hand, may prepare an EIS even in
cases where it, and not a private party, is the proponent. This may, of
course, compromise neutrality, but as Squillace points out "the conflicts
facing the agency proponent are far less significant than those facing a
private proponent. In particular, unlike the private proponent, the agency
proponent has no financial stake in the outcome." ' 6' Agencies, never-
theless, often have mission-oriented goals which are not entirely consis-
tent with responsible environmental stewardship. However as agencies
develop an ability over time to write EIAs and perform environmental
analysis, their bias should decline more quickly than if they were sitting
"on the sidelines of the EIA process." 62 Agencies, in short, that take
greater responsibility for the EIA process ought to be more successful in
the long-run in internalizing the principles of environmental responsibil-
ity163
1,56. This would be easiest to do when the government retains a consultant to prepare the assess-
ment. But either a fee or some charge based upon the total time committed to the assessment could
be levied in cases where the assessment is written by civil servants.
157.40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1999).
158. Id. § 1506.5(a). The agency, however, must evaluate the information and is responsible for
its accuracy. Id.
159. In cases where the federal government is funding state action- such as the construction of a
new bridge or another type of highway project- federal agencies are authorized to allow the state to
draft the EIS. The agency, however, must furnish guidance and participate in the preparation of the
EIS and must independently evaluate the statement prior to its adoption. See NEPA § 102(2)(D), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1994). Although this provision may be a necessary bow to the American form
of federalism, it seems to dilute responsibility for the final product and cede too much responsibility
to state agencies who often view NEPA (especially in states lacking a mini-NEPA) as a time-wasting
nuisance. It results, in many cases, in astonishingly poor attempts, perhaps even cynical attempts, to
comply with the dictates of NEPA.
160.40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c).
161. Squillace, supra note 123, at 102. Perhaps one way to lessen the potential for bias is to direct
a central environmental office to offer technical assistance and advice to the sectoral ministries on
the preparation of assessments.
162. Id. at 103.
163. See CALDWELL, supra note 99, at 58-71 (discussing the way in which the NEPA process was
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6. Public Participation -and Agency Comment
An easy and relatively inexpensive way to try to ensure a higher de-
gree of objectivity during the EIA process is to give the public an op-
portunity to comment on a draft version of the EIA that has been trans-
lated into the local language.' 64  While written comments should
certainly be sought and accepted, the submission of views in written
form is simply not a practical option for illiterate or semi-literate indi-
viduals. Public meetings, therefore, must be held 165 so that the EIA can
be summarized for the affected community in an oral and non-technical
fashion, and comments can be taken and recorded. 66  Workshops can
also be held in an effort to educate the public about the project. 67 Other
agencies that have special expertise or jurisdiction should also participate
in the EIA process in order to check the rather natural inclination of proj-
ect proponents to elevate their more parochial goals above relevant envi-
ronmental considerations. 168  These agencies, in fact, should be required
to comment to ensure that they are actually watching.
69
Public participation is not just a useful exercise in democracy. It pro-
duces additional data and information 17 as well as a broad array of new
internalized in U.S. federal agencies).
164. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (1999) (circulation of the EIS); id. § 1503.1 (inviting comments);
DRAh7 IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(3) (requiring that concerned parties have access to
the EIA procedure); Yeater & Kurukulasuriya, supra note 119, at 264-65 (while most EIA legisla-
tion makes some provision for public participation, it takes a number of forms including publication
of information, a right to request information from the government, access to EIA documents, an
opportunity to comment, and public hearings).
165. An informal gathering would be fine if that will obtain better results than a formal hearing.
See Y. J. AHMAD & G. K. SAMMY, GUIDELINES TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 41 (UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 85, 1987) (arguing that
a formal public hearing is "the worst possible approach to public involvement" in many developing
countries).
166. The CEQ NEPA regulations only require a public hearing or public meeting when it is "ap-
propriate," and an agency is to consider such things as the degree of environmental controversy, the
amount of interest in holding the hearing, or a request from another agency in deciding whether a
public gathering is appropriate. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(c) (1999). Agency regulations, however, may
require a public hearing. The IUCN Draft Covenant would not require a public hearing in every
case, but would require, at a minimum, "a sufficient notice and comment period." IUCN Draft
Covenant, supra note 104, at 122 (commentary on art.37(3)).
167. See Squillace, supra note 123, at 105.
168. See Andreen, supra note 99, at 207.
169. See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994) (requiring that agencies preparing an
EIS to "obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special exper-
tise with respect to any environmental impact involved"). See also Michael C. Blurnm & Stephen
R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277 (1990) (concluding that American courts are likely to reach conclusions
about NEPA compliance which are consistent with positions advanced by the commenting agen-
cies).
170. All substantive comments received on the draft EIA should be attached to the final assess-
ment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(b) (1999). To make this exercise comprehensive, all substantive oral
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perspectives, which should make the final EJA more thorough and more
rational. Open participation in the EIA process should also help to flush
out serious analytical errors in the EIA as well as any possible bias.
While it may be tempting to ignore a troublesome comment, it is virtu-
ally impossible to do so if the drafter is required not only to receive, but
also to respond to all of the relevant comments in the course of the final
EIA.17 1 Not only does this make the drafter actually listen, but it also
makes it more difficult for any interested person or group to have influ-
ence beyond the merits of their argument. The drafter will have to re-
spond in some reasonable way to all of the serious arguments made by
any person or any group, regardless of wealth or status. 72  Drafters
should be required to respond to the views expressed by the comment
agencies for precisely the same reasons. In this way, both the public as
well as the environmental agencies can strive to keep science, reason,
and the principles of sustainable development at the forefront of the EIA
process.173
7. EIA and Administrative Decision-making
The EIA is simply a planning document that is intended to inform the
ultimate decision-maker about the ramifications of the decision that he or
she is about to make. The legislation, therefore, should explicitly require
that the EIA and all other relevant environmental documents actually ac-
company the proposal through the agency review process and require the
decision-maker to consider the range of alternatives and mitigation
measures set forth in the EIA. 174 To help ensure that this occurs, the new
or revised legislation can also direct the preparation of a decision docu-
m1ent 175 to be made available to the public. A decision document should
comments ought to be reduced to writing and appended to the final document.
171. The CEQ NEPA regulations require agencies to respond to comments in the final statement.
Possible responses include the modification of the alternatives to the proposal, the development of
new alternatives, analytical improvements, factual corrections, or an explanation of why the com-
ments do not warrant any further agency response. Id. § 1503.4(a).
172. See generally William L. Andreen, Administrative Rule-Making in the United States: An
Examination of the Values that Have Shaped the Process, CANBERRA BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 112, 116
(Oct. 1991) (discussing public participation in the context of informal rule-making).
173. Public participation actually ought to begin during the scoping process- which occurs before
the draft EIA is prepared. The scoping process is the stage when the scope of the EIA is set and the
issues that will be explored in depth are identified. Recognizing the importance of these early deci-
sions, the U.S. CEQ requires agencies to establish an open process for scoping and directs them to
invite the participation of interested persons. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1999).
174. See id. § 1505.1 (the CEQ regulations, however, do not require the consideration of mitiga-
tion measures contained in the EIA). See also DRAFT IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(3)
(requiring parties to "ensure that the authority deciding on approval takes into consideration all ob-
servations made during the environmental impact assessment process").
175. This document can be integrated into any other record generated by the agency.
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state what the decision was, what alternatives were considered, which
alternative was thought preferable from an environmental perspective,
and how various factors - including the agency's mission and the na-
tional environmental policy - were balanced in reaching the ultimate
decision. 176 The document should also state whether all practicable miti-
gation measures were adopted, and, if not, why not. 177  The decision
document thereby serves as a device which seeks to ensure that the goals
of the EIA process do not wither as a result of bureaucratic hostility or
passivity.
8. Administrative Oversight
The effectiveness of this entire scheme would be further enhanced by
the creation of an institutional arrangement that would encourage the de-
sired reorientation of government decision-making. The Draft Interna-
tional Covenant, in fact, would require parties to "designate appropriate
national authorities to ensure that EIAs are effective and conducted under
accessible procedures." 17' The comment agencies would form the first
structural safeguard in this regard although their review ought not to be
limited to an examination of the technical adequacy of an EIA. Their re-
view should extend to the substantive merits of the proposed action, and,
in doing so, the comment agencies should take into account any national
articulation of environmental policy. 
79
The comment agencies and the action agency, however, may still find
themselves at loggerheads even after the final EIA has been prepared. In
such cases, it would be wise to provide an opportunity for these agencies
to elevate the dispute to a higher level of government. In the United
States, conflicts over the technical merits of an EIA or the environmental
merits of the project itself can be referred to the President's Council on
Environmental Quality.180 After giving the action agency an opportunity
to respond to the referral,' the CEQ may take one or more actions. The
CEQ may, for instance, try to mediate the dispute, hold public meetings,
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(a), (b) (1999); DRAFT IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(3)
(requiring that the action agency make its decision public).
177. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (1999). The CEQ rules go on to require agencies to implement
any mitigation measures which are committed as part of the decision document. See id. § 1505.3.
178. DRAFT IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(3).
179. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.3(a) (1999) (stating that comments may address the merits of the vari-
ous alternatives as well as the adequacy of the statement).
180. See Clean Air Act § 309(b) (directing U.S. EPA to refer actions found to be environmentally
unsatisfactory); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1504 (1999) (providing for referral of interagency disagreements con-
ceming federal actions that might cause unsatisfactory environmental effects). The CEQ, neverthe-
less, encourages the parties to try to resolve their differences informally at an earlier stage in the pro-
cess. See id. § 1504.2.
181. See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.3(d) (1999).
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make findings and issue recommendations, or even submit the matter
(with the Council's recommendation) to the President for action.'8 2 On
the other hand, the CEQ may simply drop the matter if it concludes that
the issue lacks "national importance."' 83 While referrals have not been
common, they have been a relatively effective tool for resolving disputes
in an environmentally sensitive way since "[t]he mere possibility of an
eventual referral has encouraged moderation and compromise." 184
Even though a CEQ referral can be made on the basis of a proposal
which presents a possibly unsatisfactory environmental impact, these re-
ferrals must be made before an agency actually makes its final deci-
sion. '8 CEQ referrals, therefore, are strictly pre-decisional in nature,
geared primarily toward the production of better assessment documents,
and not at the environmental merits of an agency's actual decision or
how well that decision is implemented. 186 A better link could be forged
by permitting the comment agencies to refer final decisions to the same
high-ranking body because, for example, adequate mitigation measures
were not incorporated in the final approval or because the agency's deci-
sion is found environmentally wanting on some other ground. 8 7 Since
there is a need to proceed as quickly as possible with development proj-
ects and to keep their costs down in developing countries, such a review
process would have to be prompt and conclude in an expeditious resolu-
tion of any referrals.
No matter how well decisions may be crafted, they still have to be
executed. Action agencies, therefore, ought to be directed to conduct a
monitoring program that is designed to ensure compliance with the miti-
gation measures and other conditions found in the agency's decision
document. 81 The results of the monitoring program ought to be made
182. See id. §§ 1504.3(f)(2), (3), (6), (7).
183. Id. § 1504.3(0(4).
184. Andreen, supra note 99, at 240.
185. Agencies must deliver their referrals to CEQ within 25 days after the final EIS has been
made available to EPA, other commenting agencies, and the public. See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.3(b)
(1999). On the other hand, agencies may not make decisions on proposals which have been explored
through an assessment process until at least 30 days after the final impact statement has been made
available. See id. § 1506.10(b)(2) (1999).
186. See Andreen, supra note 99, at 241.
187. See id. at 253-58.
188. The Draft IUCN Covenant provides that "[p]arties shall conduct periodic reviews both to
determine whether activities approved by them are carried out in compliance with the conditions set
out in the approval and to evaluate the effectiveness of the prescribed mitigation measures." DRAFT
IUCN COVENANT, supra note 104, art. 37(4). The CEQ rules, however, merely encourage agencies
to provide for monitoring in important cases. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1999). See generally GILPIN,
supra note 110, at 26 (referring to post-project analysis as a "most effective tool" for improving the
EIA process by ensuring that the development occurs "under the terms and conditions imposed by
the initial EIA process and its associated development consent or planning approval").
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available to the commenting agencies for study. 89 Should a significant
deviation from the terms of the final decision occur that would compro-
mise the quality of the human environment, the commenting agencies
ought to be authorized to take the matter to the same high-level body for
further review.19°
9. Judicial Review
Although NEPA was the first piece of environmental legislation en-
acted in 1970 (the beginning of the "environmental decade"), its text is
brief and its language quite general. In many respects, therefore, NEPA
more resembles a classic piece of New Deal legislation rather than the
extremely detailed and complex environmental legislation that was typi-
cally enacted in the United States during the 1970s and subsequent dec-
ades. Its vague language, in fact, prompted a number of mission-oriented
agencies to contend that Congress had granted them a great deal of lee-
way in deciding how to construe the statute. This attitude led to a num-
ber of crabbed interpretations of NEPA and rather half-hearted compli-
ance by some agencies.' 9' The federal courts reacted vigorously to this
grudging kind of implementation by strictly enforcing the procedural
components of the Act in order to guarantee that "important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." 192 In so doing, the federal
courts eventually fashioned a large body of law which compels agencies
to take the EIS process seriously.' 93
Judicial review, therefore, is more responsible than any other factor for
improving the quality of the assessment process in the United States,
94
and keeping mission-oriented agencies on their toes.' 95 Of course, the
availability of a judicial tool to challenge government action is not al-
ways viewed with favor, 196 or considered appropriate within a particular
189. The monitoring data should also be made available to the public. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3(d)
(1999) (providing that the results of any relevant monitoring ought to be made available to the public
upon request).
190. See Andreen, supra note 99, at 259. There may well be situations where it would be advis-
able- due to possible conflicts of interest within the commenting ministries or likely reticence
brought about by political weakness- to authorize this body to review EIAs, decision documents, and
monitoring results on its own initiative.
191. See Andreen, supra note 75, at 98-99.
192. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
193. See Andreen, supra note 75, at 99.
194. See Squillace, supra note 123, at 113.
195. See Justice Paul Stein, Can Review Bodies Lead to Better Decision-Making?, CANBERRA
BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 118, 119 (Oct. 1991).
196. See Ahmad & Sammy, supra note 165, at 37 (referring to the possibility that objectors could
use an overloaded judicial system as a "stalling" device); GILPIN, supra note 110, at 118 (stating
that judicial review of EIA decisions is avoided in most countries because they are viewed "as ex-
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society or legal system. 197 Nevertheless, the drafters of new or revised
EIA legislation ought to seriously weigh both the considerable advan-
tages as well as the possible disadvantages (such as political opposition
to the entire reform package) of explicitly authorizing individuals to
bring suit for violations of the EIA process.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
An overall legislative reform strategy cannot be developed without
also addressing the allocation of institutional responsibilities for envi-
ronmental management. The two issues are completely interdependent.
One cannot settle upon a course for environmental law reform without
considering the effectiveness of the current institutional structure and
how that structure ought to be rearranged. How well do the various of-
fices with environmental responsibilities perform their tasks? Is there a
serious lack of coordination among government offices? Are there juris-
dictional conflicts or overlapping activities? What tasks ought to be re-
assigned? Can the government increase the likelihood (through institu-
tional oversight) that the development projects, which various arms of
the government sponsor or approve, have a more benign impact upon the
environment? Should new institutions be created or is it more efficient
to try to improve existing institutions?
Traditionally, natural resource and environmental issues were dealt
with through the use of sectoral laws for specific resources such as water,
wildlife, fisheries, forests, minerals, and land. The statutes were primar-
ily aimed at the allocation and use of these resources rather than, the
principles of sustainable development. Over time, however, environ-
mental or conservation provisions were often "grafted onto these legal
regimes" in ad-hoc fashion to deal with particular crises, 98 such as se-
vere soil erosion in an agricultural district, or a diminishing water supply
due to forest depletion. 99 Gradually, these statutes became more ori-
pensive and time-consuming").
197. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 24 (a reliance on litigation "may not be appropriate" due to
"[i]nformal processes of dispute resolution involving negotiation and compromise [which] are much
more widely accepted practice in most developing countries"). Other reasons which are given for
rejecting judicial review include the lack of an adequately developed judicial system or the lack of
adequately trained lawyers. In some nations, moreover, a provision for judicial review might be
viewed as inappropriate due to the existence of specialized bodies which are dedicated specifically to
the review of administrative action. In such a legal system, EIA review could be placed within the
jurisdiction of such a specialized tribunal.
198. Wilson et. al., supra note 48, at 189.
199. See. e.g., Christopher A. Conte, Colonial Science and Ecological Change: Tanzania s Mlalo
Basin, 1888-1946, 4 ENVTL. HISTORY 220 (1999) (addressing the reaction of a colonial government
to accelerated soil erosion).
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ented toward long-term management of the particular resource. Water
laws, for instance, began to include components aimed at pollution con-
trol and prevention, 2°° and wildlife legislation began to set forth lists of
protected animals and birds and to impose strict limits on trade in endan-
201gered species.
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, it became increasingly clear
that some central governmental body had to be created that could advise
the government on a wide array of environmental matters and help the
government coordinate activities and formulate policy. This recognition
led a number of countries to establish a small but prestigious commission
or council,2 °2 often beginning as a purely advisory body and later evolv-
ing into an entity possessing some oversight or regulatory authority." 3
At the same time, the traditional natural resource ministries continued
generally to retain jurisdiction over the earlier resource-oriented legisla-
tion, together with their anti-pollution and conservation measures.
204
Occasionally, some of these ministries delegated specific environmental
duties to a new department or division within the ministry, such as a soil
conservation unit within a ministry of agriculture.0 5
Eventually, many nations opted to create a new central environmental
ministry or to create a subsidiary division within an existing ministry that
was completely devoted to environmental matters.20 6 These ministries or
ministerial departments were created for various reasons: to implement
programs that a more advisory body like a council might not be able to
200. The Tanzanian water law, for example, the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act of
1974 (Govt. Notice No. 42), was extensively amended in 1981 to add a number of provisions aimed
at water pollution. See TANZANIAN ENVTL. LEGISLATION, supra note 53.
201. See Wilson, supra note 48, at 189-190.
202. The National Environment Management Council of Tanzania (NEMC), for example, was
established as a parastatal body in 1983 to perform a number of functions. The Council was di-
rected, inter alia, to formulate policy and recommend its implementation to the government; to coor-
dinate environmental activities; to specify standards, norms, and criteria to protect the environment;
to disseminate information on the environment; to formulate proposals for environmental legislation;
to stimulate public participation; and to perform such other functions as the relevant Minister may
assign. See The National Environment Management Act, 1983 § 4 (Govt. Notice No. 19); see also
Madati, supra note 48, at 314 (discussing the organization of NEMC, including the formation of its
secretariat). NEMC originally operated under the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources, and Tour-
ism. It now operates under the Office of the Vice President.
203. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 11; Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 6-7 (discussing national
environmental "secretariats"); Tookey, supra note 48, at 312-15 (explaining the composition and
role of the National Environment Board of Thailand).
204. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 11.
205. See Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 6.
206. See id. at 5-6. In Tanzania, a Division of Environment was created in 1990 and placed in the
Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment. See CUELLAR, supra note 34, at 12. The
Division of Environment was transferred to the Vice President's Office in late 1995. See LEAT Re-
port, supra note 48.
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accomplish; to give the environment a stronger voice within the govern-
ment; to be a better match for the strength of the mission-oriented agen-
cies; to create a stronger claim to national budgetary resources; 2°v to in-
crease prestige; and perhaps, in some instances, to create the mere
impression of progress. New ministries or ministerial departments, how-
ever, have often proved to be primarily advisory in nature, and their abil-
ity to coordinate government action has suffered from a generally weak
position relative to the more traditional sectoral ministries, especially
those that deal with major economic sectors such as mining, industry, oil,
and agriculture.2 °8
Today, developing nations find themselves with various combinations
of these institutions: an environmental council or commission with a high
political profile supported by a secretariat; a centralized environmental
ministry; a centralized environmental division within another ministry;
various environmental and conservation roles assigned to different min-
istries; and new environmental departments within various ministries. 209
The result, in many instances, is confusion, overlap, and ineffectiveness:
precisely the result that many developers and businesspeople favor. De-
spite rising popular sentiment in favor of environmental protection and
the appearance of government activity, business interests have often seen
their influence over regulatory issues increase rather than decrease. 10
The development of an effective institutional strategy is, therefore, of
the utmost importance. It also presents quite a challenge, both analyti-
cally and politically. One useful tool for analysis is to break the functions
of government with respect to the environment into two categories: those
activities that involve the management of natural resources and those that
deal more directly with pollution.
The highest institutional priority vis-a-vis traditional resource-oriented
ministries is to create an institutional structure that will help ensure that
environmental considerations are integrated into their normal decision-
making process.21' The primary way to do that is through environmental
impact assessment and the internalization of the values that it represents.
EIA ought to be performed by each action agency and integrated into
existing structures for reviewing proposed projects and making policy.
212
207. See Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 6-7.
208. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 14.
209. See id. at 12-14.
210. See Gareth Porter, Trade Competition and Pollution Standards: "Race to the Bottom " or
"Stuck at the Bottom "?, 8 J. ENV'T. & DEV. 133, 141 (attributing this characteristic in many devel-
oping countries to the unresponsiveness of political institutions).
211. See supra notes 97-107, 113-115, 134-135, 163-189 and accompanying text.
212. The EIA units within each sectoral ministry could work closely with existing staff as they try
to mainstream environmental concerns and values. These units could also be given somewhat
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Political or economic pressures, however, may still hold sway over envi-
ronmental concerns in many instances and, while comments and criti-
cism may come from other environmental units within other sectoral
ministries, their jurisdiction is limited. Therefore, one should create or
recognize some high-level body to which commenting agencies could
refer a technically inadequate EIA or a project deemed environmentally
unsatisfactory. Depending upon the circumstances, one might also want
to authorize this body to review EIAs and decision documents sua
sponte.
In order to avoid any potential conflict of interest and to ensure objec-
tivity, this central high-level body ought to be independent of any or-
ganization or ministry that has an economic or development-oriented
mission. The various environmental councils or commissions that al-
ready exist in many countries would be obvious candidates for such a
task. In some cases, they may have to be strengthened by tying them di-
213rectly to the office of the President, the Prime Minister, or perhaps a
Cabinet committee or subcommittee.214 In any case, the institution must
be bold enough to ask the hard questions and hopefully creative enough
to offer constructive recommendations to reconcile the tensions that of-
ten arise between the demands for rapid development, on the one hand,
and environmental sustainability, on the other.21 5
Responsibility for various pollution control activities (water pollution,
pesticides, marine pollution, hazardous waste) may already be assigned
to a number of sectoral ministries and other government offices. At
times, the jurisdictional reach of these entities may overlap.216 Numerous
agencies, for example, may share authority for regulating water pollution
while other polluting activities may totally escape statutory attention.
Even when the legislature has acted, there may have been a failure to im-
broader responsibility in regard to policy formulation and program coordination. See NAT'L
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 48, at 43-44 (referring to such a unit as an environmental
"focal point"); Lausche, supra note 47, at 14-15 (discussing the advantages of placing environ-
mental units within existing sectoral ministries).
213. These locations may not be ideal in every country. "Being in the office of the head of state
or government does not automatically confer the power and visibility of that office. In fact, the of-
fice of the president or prime minister can sometimes be likened to an orphanage for agencies left to
fend for themselves .. " Dorm-Adzobu, supra note 58, at 36.
214. A specialized agency possessing scientific expertise, such as a science and technology board
or commission, may be much too weak to exert influence effectively when it comes to a government
decision concerning a major development project. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 15.
215. This institution could also be an important advisor on high-level environmental policy- es-
pecially on a number of cross-cutting issues. For example, would a new approach to land tenure
(say, more private holdings) advance the conservation of soil resources; do subsidies for pesticides
and "artificial" fertilizers create an unwise bias against more sustainable forms of agriculture; or do
current tax policies promote the quick cutting of timber?
216. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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plement or enforce the regulatory scheme.2" 7 These problems are often
difficult to discern in their entirety since the diffusion of responsibility
serves to obscure the gaps and overlaps that exist and shields from view
any serious breakdowns between legislative purposes and actual en-
forcement.21 8  Any serious reform effort, however, will have to confront
the fragmentation, lack of coordination, and antiquated structures that
characterize pollution control law in so many developing countries.
One way to deal with these scattered activities and regulatory short-
falls is by consolidating responsibility for pollution control within one
institution that is authorized to administer a comprehensive environ-
mental protection program. 21 9 A logical location for this authority would
be the existing ministry for the environment or the existing ministerial
division or department for the environment. 220 Theoretically, such a pro-
posal might create a firestorm of political opposition since it would in-
volve the transfer of existing pollution control activities. In many in-
stances, however, these programs operate with few resources and few
personnel, so a reorganization of this sort might not cause a significant
loss of funding or staff. Even the loss of prestige could be mitigated
since the offices that may lose some functions can continue to make a
contribution toward pollution control by focusing their efforts upon pro-
grams that best reflect their expertise. A bureau of standards could offer
advice on pollution standards (rather than setting them); the fisheries of-
217. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 11-12
(referring to the lack of implementation and enforcement as well as to shortcomings in the scope and
content of the legislation).
218. See Kamukala, supra note 55, at 5.
219. Another logical but more far-reaching approach would be to consolidate all pollution control
and natural resource responsibilities within a new ministry for environmental protection and natural
resources. See, e.g., Halina Szejnwald Brown et al., Environmental Reforms in Poland: A Case for
Cautious Optimism, 40 ENVT. 10, 11 (1998) (referring to Poland's new Ministry of Environmental
Protection, Natural Resources, and Forestry). A danger posed by such an approach, however, is the
possibility that the new ministry- composed largely of development-oriented staff- will devote
most of its resources, attention, and personnel to questions of resource development (forestry, fish-
eries, mining, etc.) rather than environmental protection. Poland perhaps solved that problem by
retaining and strengthening an independent monitoring and enforcement agency, the State Environ-
mental Protection Inspectorate. See id.
A proposal to consolidate natural resource responsibilities as well as pollution control supervision
in one ministry is also bound to draw strong opposition from the ministries which already deal with
natural resources such as forestry, fisheries, and mining. They would stand to lose considerable
funding, personnel, and power. See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA 's Organizational Structure, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 5, 18-21 (1991) (reviewing departmental opposition in the U.S. to consolidating
all natural resource responsibilities as well as pollution control in one department). On the other
hand, the United States might have enjoyed "better natural resource and environmental protection
policies" if the consolidation occurred. Id. at 5.
220. The reorganization would thereby strengthen an institution which already exists in many
countries. See Halter, supra note 76, at 233 (arguing for the strengthening of existing institutions
rather the creation of new ones).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
fice could be charged with preventing dynamite and cyanide fishing, and
the coast guard, with preventing oil spills from ships, rather than either
dealing with all marine pollution; a water office could be called upon to
deal with the problems posed by return flows from irrigated agriculture.
Some existing offices, however, may do double duty (for example, is-
suing water withdrawal permits as well as wastewater permits), which is
a desirable situation for any resource strapped government, but a compli-
cating factor in a governmental reorganization. Such an office could be
entirely transferred to an environment ministry or department, and the
move would make good sense due to the influence of water quantity
upon water quality.22' It would also give the environment ministry or
department additional and, most likely, much-needed clout. Politics,
nevertheless, might intervene to prevent such a large-scale transfer. So
the question will devolve into whether it is better to leave the pollution
control function in the hands of the existing office, taking advantage of
their perhaps considerable field presence, or whether the pollution con-
trol function - with perhaps few, if any, staff- ought to be transferred.
The regulatory responsibility for pollution control, however, should re-
side, for the most part, within one institution that is advised and assisted
by other offices. Such an approach would simplify the effort to harmo-
nize a country's pollution law and might facilitate organizational inno-
vations (the establishment of regional offices and the delegation of cer-
tain carefully defined functions to local authorities) that may improve
implementation at the local level.222 The combination of functions would
also enable the environment ministry or division to set appropriate pri-
orities for regulation and enforcement, and would facilitate cross-media
enforcement efforts as well as integrated approaches to pollution control
and prevention. Such a consolidation would also clarify which agency is
organizationally responsible for the proper administration of the pollu-
tion statutes. This fact, combined with increased visibility, should lead to
greater accountability and a higher probability that the law will be faith-
fully executed.
221. See U.S. E.P.A., NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, 1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS 19
(1998); DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997).
222. Although there are a number of arguments supporting the creation of regional offices (de-
centralization) or delegation of certain programs to local government (devolution), studies of such
programs in developing countries suggest that few have been successful in carrying out the pro-
grams. "Too little attention has been paid to identifying the appropriate functions to decentralize,
local level capacity and resource needs for carrying out decentralized functions, and other obstacles
in the development planning and decision-making process." Lausche, supra note 47, at 36.
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V. ENCOURAGING LOCAL OWNERSHIP
A. Local Consultants
"Country ownership" is an absolute requirement for a successful law
reform effort.223 Foreign experts cannot be relied upon to do most of the
necessary research or to perform most of the necessary analysis. If the
donors were to bring in foreign consultants to do all of the technical
work and to choose the direction and scope of the effort, the result would
most likely be a large stack of paper and little action.224 Local lawyers,
local academics, and other local professionals must be involved in the
work at every single stage of the process. They are the experts when it
comes to how the local laws and institutions operate. They are better in-
formed than any external consultant about the precise nature of the envi-
ronmental problems and development difficulties facing their country, 225
and their knowledge and expertise should be tapped in order to conduct
the necessary review of existing legal and institutional structures. Their
involvement is crucial to an understanding of how the system actually
functions in the field. Their input will be indispensable later in the proc-
ess when a workable strategy for reform is developed and the necessary
legislation together with implementing regulations are drafted.
In short, the use of local experts should help ensure that the legal and
institutional proposals that grow out of this process will be consistent
with the nation's environmental needs, as well as its legal and political
system, traditions, and social customs. 226 That consistency is absolutely
necessary if the proposals are going to have a realistic chance of enact-
ment and eventual enforcement.227 In addition, the use of local experts
aids in the capacity building effort and will ensure that there will be pro-
fessionals available who are intimately acquainted with the legislative
history of the new institutional structure and environmental statutes -
invaluable assets as the reforms are implemented and the new laws en-
forced in the years to follow.
2 28
B. Creating a Participatory Process
The use of local experts, however, is not enough to guarantee that the
223. See Remarks of Sherif Omar Hassan, supra note 60.
224. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
225. See Kaniaru et al., supra note 35, at 159.
226. See William Wilson, Environmental Law as Development Assistance, 22 Envtl. L. 953, 954
(1992).
227. See Kaniaru et al., supra note 35, at 159.
228. See id.
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community or the government will identify with the reforms that are
proposed. To increase the odds of acceptance and to create a better fit,
the views of the community and the government must be sought at all
important decision points: as the vision for change is generated; as spe-
cific strategies are developed; and as legislative proposals are drafted. 29
The workshops or seminars held to seek this advice should be open to all
interested persons and the participation of all of the relevant government
offices, concerned legislators, environmental NGOs, 230 law professors
and other interested academics, environmental engineers, as well as law-
yers and other professionals who are interested in environmental affairs
should be strongly encouraged. A special effort should be made, moreo-
ver, to seek participation at the local and regional levels as part of a sin-
cere effort to enhance coordination between the national government and
local and regional authorities, 23' as well as to craft programs that recog-
nize and build upon local institutions and practices.
232
These workshops or seminars ought to be organized in a way that will
allow the participants to thoroughly discuss reports and review draft leg-
islation. Copies of workshop and seminar materials should be available
in advance of the meeting and they should be translated into all the rele-
vant languages. In addition, it is not enough to simply seek comments on
various reports and draft legislation for those documents may well, per-
haps in irrevocable fashion, establish the terms and limits of the discus-
sion that will follow. Meetings or workshops, ought to be held before
each major stage of the process begins in order to help identify important
issues for the consultants to study and guide them in an appropriate di-
rection. These early "scoping" meetings should, therefore, be more than
brainstorming sessions. 'These meetings should also help ensure that the
community and the government have and maintain an active role in set-
ting the agenda for the reform process.
229. As B.B. Nganwa Kamugasha has observed:
Governments can make laws, but unless the public understands them and to some degree sup-
ports them, the laws will remain on paper. The process should therefore involve consultation
and consensus building with the different elements of the population. Furthermore, consulta-
tion should not be restricted to the initial stages of national environmental policy development;
it should be an ongoing process.
Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 3.
230. For a discussion of the growing role which environmental NGOs play in developing coun-
tries, see Dorm-Adzobu, supra note 58, at 54; McCutcheon, supra note 14, at 439-40. Environ-
mental NGOs are "an important voice for the public interest" and can also serve as a voice on behalf
of marginalized people (e.g., the rural resource users). Veit & Wolfire, supra note 66, at 160.
231. See Halter, supra note 76, at 233 (stressing the importance of balancing responsibilities and
increasing coordination amongst local, regional, and national authorities).
232. See Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 9 (emphasizing the need to reinforce many traditional
community-based systems for resource management).
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VI. CAPACITY BUILDING
In order to be successful, law reform projects in the developing world
cannot end with the drafting and parliamentary enactment of a revamped
legal and institutional structure for environmental management. Those
steps, although difficult to surmount, pose a lesser challenge than the fi-
nal step: implementation. The new laws and programs must be imple-
mented and enforced. All too often, however, environmental legislation
has been a dead letter in developing countries because of a lack of ade-
quately trained personnel, insufficient administrative and technical sup-
port, and limited financial resources.233 Even more serious is the lack of
political will and commitment to build and maintain a strong environ-
mental program.234 No aid program can provide this type of commit-
ment. It either exists or it does not. In fact, a comprehensive reform ef-
fort probably ought not to be undertaken unless there is demonstrable
support at the highest levels of government.
Assuming that such political support exists, the other obstacles to ef-
fective implementation can be addressed. Institutional capacities can be
enhanced. However, no one ought to harbor any illusions on this score.
Institution building is one of the "most difficult and elusive" of objec-
tives, and the failure to provide adequate capacity remains one of the
major causes behind the failure of development programs.235 In fact, as
David Fairman and Michael Ross noted, "many development practitio-
ners have found the problem of 'institutional weakness' so intractable
that they prefer to ignore the issue altogether and instead worry about
more tangible problems." 23 6 The problem is indeed difficult. A "bar-
rage" of short-term training courses will not "bring about sturdy envi-
ronmental institutions in low and middle-income countries."237 Nor will
short-term visits to environmental agencies or law schools in other coun-
tries bring them about, although those are certainly better expenditures of
resources than the popular and rather useless exercise of sending delega-
233. See Randall Baker, Institutional Innovation, Development, and Environmental Management:
An Administrative Trap Revisited, Part 1, 9 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 45 (1989) (asserting that environ-
mental legislation is "rarely" enforced due to insufficient technical and administrative resources);
see also O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 73 (referring to the fact that these new environmental agen-
cies often occupy "a subordinate position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, with limited budget and in-
experienced and often underqualified personnel").
234. See Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 12; see also Baker, supra note 233, at 45 (referring to un-
der-enforcement caused by the influence of powerful groups who derive financial rewards from the
rapid and unregulated exploitation of the environment).
235. Halter, supra note 76, at 232. See also Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 41 ("[C]apacity
building has been the Achilles' heel of a great many development projects.").
236. Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 42.
237. Id. at 44.
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tions of visiting professionals (such as judges) to a developing country
for a week-long general visit. Capacity building is a long-term process
and, to engage in it successfully, donors will have to control their desire
to show taxpayers quick, tangible results. It will take time. Donors will
also have to try to curb their tendency to supply the staff, skills, and
technologies that they believe are necessary to solve certain capacity
problems since such quick fixes may deprive the local bureaucracy of the
very training and experience they will need to maintain the program in
the longer term.238
Capacity building cannot be undertaken casually. It is vitally impor-
tant, and it must be carefully planned. The first step to "increasing the
effectiveness of aid programs depends on correctly identifying and ad-
dressing the missing form and location of capacity." 
239
Problems at environmental agencies often include a shortage or lack of
adequately trained staff, poor management capacity, lack of certain pro-
fessional skills 240 such as financial accounting, limited fiscal resources,24 '
and inadequate equipment or facilities.242 In addition, government per-
sonnel often lack access to necessary information - statutes, regula-
tions, reports, and studies. Telephones are typically in scarce supply as
are computers, printers, and copying machines. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that training and staff development are "at least as
important as other government resource needs." 
243
Some necessary skills such as negotiation, dispute resolution, or the
key elements of an inspection program can perhaps be taught through
relatively short-term training exercises. These training programs can be
held in-country or, perhaps even better, at a regional level.2 " At times,
however, environmental officials may profit more from a longer-term,
hands-on experience in a developed country (to see, for example, .how
the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service deals with its commenting obligations
under NEPA, or to observe how another agency implements a permit
program or develops standards). One way to provide that sort of practi-
cal training is through "twinning arrangements" with institutions in de-
veloped countries that can provide both the experience as well as the
necessary training.245 Other kinds of skills (such as specialization in en-
238. See id. at 42.
239. Connolly, supra note 43, at 344.
240. See Lausche, supra note 47, at 19.
241. See id. at 23.
242. See Kamugasha, supra note 45, at 12.
243. Halter, supra note 76, at 233.
244. See id. at 246-47. A regional training center could be established at a local university or re-
search institution. Id. at 247.
245. See Dorm-Adzobu, supra note 58, at 63-4. These organizational arrangements and the rela-
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vironmental law, accounting, or public health training) may demand
long-term, formal educational opportunities abroad, unless the skills can
be acquired locally. The best candidates for such training, however, may
not be veteran government employees, but young, relatively recent uni-
versity graduates who are committed to the cause of environmental pro-
tection. They may be more likely to remain on the job once their training
has concluded, and less likely to seek further education just to gain the
attractive per diems that travel abroad often offers.246
Providing the other ingredients of a regulatory infrastructure is perhaps
less difficult. Small libraries containing copies of relevant materials as
well as Internet access can be placed in government offices for use by
both the bureaucracy and the public.247 Copies of statutes and regula-
tions can be placed in the hands of those who need them, and adequate
office equipment provided so people can do their jobs efficiently and ef-
fectively. If local governments are going to be relied upon in some way,
they will need to be strengthened. More difficult or awkward, however,
is the question of operating costs. Capacity building does not just in-
volve putting an institution on its feet. It also involves keeping it there
with adequate funding for staff and infrastructure. Therefore, capacity
building "must include provisions for long-term recurrent financing." 
24
Capacity building should not just focus on the environmental branches
of government. The capacity of sectoral ministries, for instance, may
have to be strengthened if they are going to be capable of performing en-
vironmental assessments and the integration of environmental values into
their development strategies.249 In fact, the coordinating ability of an en-
vironmental agency could be strengthened immeasurably if these funds
could be channeled through such an agency.23 ° The support of non-
governmental organizations, furthermore, is a marvelous way to promote
concern for the environment within a nation and to augment the envi-
tionships that develop between individuals may help "ensure prolonged contact between trainers and
trainees and between the institutions as well." Id. at 64.
246. See LANCASTER, supra note 21, at 58 (discussing the problems of development patronage).
247. In some cases, it may be efficient to establish regional programs to gather environmental in-
formation about common resources or common problems and to exchange data about policy alterna-
tives. The six nations which share the rainforest of the Congo Basin, for example, are developing a
project, with the help of the World Bank and other donors, to develop and share information about
the rainforest and to encourage sound land-use planning. See WORLD BANK (ENVIRONMENT
GROUP), CENTRAL AFRICA REGION: REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
PROJECT iv (Rpt. No. 17006-AFR, Dec. 1997).
248. Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 43.
249. See Connolly, supra note 43, at 345.
250. See Dorm-Adzobu, supra note 58, at 42-3 (relating how Ghana's Environmental Protection
Agency increased its level of goodwill and cooperation from line ministries by sharing funds and
resources for implementing the Ghana Environmental Resource Management Project).
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ronmental capacity of their government.25'
Environmental NGOs can lobby their governments to keep the envi-
ronment high on the political agenda.2 52 They can monitor government
performance and publicize shortcomings.253 They can even litigate when214
necessary. In fact, enhancing the capabilities of local environmental
NGOs may be one of the most effective things a donor can do to promote
concern for the environment.255  NGOs can play a broader role as well,
putting pressure on governments to dismantle one-party regimes and to
implement democratic reforms.
2 5 6
NGOs, however, can "be overwhelmed" by expectations that exceed
their grasp.257 Many NGOs lack the expertise or experience to partici-
pate effectively in the policy-making arena. For example, most African
NGOs "still lack the technical and other skills to bolster their positions,
as well as the tools to articulate positions effectively., 258 These envi-
ronmental NGOs need to be strengthened so that they can develop the
kinds of expertise that are necessary to formulate and execute effective
strategies to further their cause. They may need training in fields as di-
verse as environmental law and grassroots mobilization. Almost all will
need some help to develop their capacity to perform policy research and
analysis, and to communicate electronically with their counterparts in
both the developed and developing world.259  They also need small li-
braries that contain copies of the relevant laws, regulations, and other ba-
sic materials. Depending upon the current state of democratic reforms in
251. See Connolly, supra note 43, at 328, 345; Fairman & Ross, supra note 57, at 43. Approxi-
mately 10 % of development aid is now being channeled through NGOs (although this figure refers
primarily to northern NGOs) and NGOs in the north are collaborating more and more with their
counterparts in the developing world to improve their ability to participate in local activities. See
Dorm-Adzobu, supra note 58, at 54.
252. Connolly, supra note 43, at 345.
253. A rapidly growing category of environmental NGOs in Africa is the journalist association
such as the Journalists on Environment in Tanzania (JET) and Journalists for the Environment in
Kenya. See Veit & Wolfire, supra note 66, at 167.
254. Public interest law associations have been quickly spreading in the developing world. They
include, for example, the Lawyers' Environmental Action Group in Tanzania, the Center for Envi-
ronmental Policy and Law in Africa (CEPLA) in Kenya, and Greenwatch in Uganda. See id. at 165.
255. See Cord Jakobeit, Nonstate Actors Leading the Way: Debt-for-Nature Swaps, in
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID, supra note 43, at 149 (contending that by strengthening
"independent institutional capacity" one "can empower local self-interest, thereby gradually reduc-
ing the dependence on continued external support.").
256. See, e.g., Veit & Wolfire, supra note 66, at 179.
257. Jakobeit, supra note 255, at 150.
258. Veit & Wolfire, supra note 66, at 175. They, therefore, "risk performing poorly" and such
"performances only reinforce the perception among policy-makers (and some funders) of African
NGOs as low-cost implementors of field activities with little, if any, capacity to address complex or
technical policy issues." Id.
259. See generally id. at 177 (setting forth recommendations for improving the advocacy capacity
of NGOs).
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a particular country, they may also need some assistance in learning how
best to advocate for a more liberal approach to civil liberties and basic
political rights. 6 °
Some donors may balk at providing this kind of policy support to
NGOs. Not only may they perhaps be uncertain about whether these or-
ganizations can be effective policy advocates, but they may also be wary
of offending host governments that may view NGO funding as a diver-
sion of funding that the government might otherwise receive. The case
for supporting environmental NGOs, however, is compelling. Stronger,
more capable NGOs can become forceful voices for better policy and
better legislation. They could also help speed the transition towards
healthy, pluralistic societies.26'
In most developing nations, the legal profession will also need some
assistance in acquiring the kind of skills and knowledge needed by law-
yers and judges to implement an effective environmental program. 62
Since many local law schools do not teach and are not staffed to teach
environmental law, a faculty member may have to receive some addi-
tional training. This can be provided directly by supporting post-
graduate work for a willing faculty member or, more indirectly, by pro-
moting an exchange program between the local law school and a law
school in a developed country. Such an exchange program could help
train local faculty and assist the local law school in curriculum develop-
ment and the preparation of classroom materials. 263 The exchange pro-
gram could also be tied to an effort to encourage the local law school to
reach out to the practicing bar and judiciary by offering courses in con-
tinuing legal and judicial education. These courses could be taught by
faculty from both the local law school as well as the sister institution in
the developed world, and could cover a range of topics such as environ-
mental and administrative law.
CONCLUSION
All too often there appears to be a dramatic and disturbing gap be-
tween what governments say and what governments do. The same ap-
pears to be true for international donors. During the past ten years, the
260. See id.
261. See id. at 180-81.
262. See generally Boer, supra note 113, at 1550-52 (discussing a number of recent training pro-
grams in environmental law).
263. The law school library will most likely need to expand its holdings in environmental and ad-
ministrative law, at least in a modest way, .in order to support its new curricular offerings. The provi-
sion of some sort of direct aid to support these acquisitions is probably a far better approach than the
donation of old and out-dated books from a sister institution in the north. The sister law school,
however, can provide great help by offering advice on what materials ought to be acquired.
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developing world has been awash with donor-funded national environ-
mental action plans and national environmental programs, national con-
servation strategies, national biodiversity strategies, national agriculture
programs, and national forestry action plans. These documents generally
recognize that long-term economic development can only be sustained
on an ecologically sound base. Many also purport to recognize that the
policies and strategies they set forth will remain empty pronouncements
unless appropriate laws and institutional arrangements are put in place.
Law reform, however, is a difficult proposition. New laws are seldom
written on an entirely clean slate even in the developing world. Dozens
of environmental and natural resource laws may already exist and a large
number of government ministries and offices may be responsible for
their implementation or, in some cases, lack of implementation. There
are often serious regulatory gaps and overlapping grants of authority,
laws which are not sensitive to local customs or conditions and, in many
instances, a lack of administrative and legal capacity or even political
will to implement existing laws. Often these problems have not been
thoroughly analyzed and there has been no attempt, either at the govern-
mental level or through collaborative multilateral processes, to generate a
generally accepted vision for comprehensive legal and institutional re-
form.
Legal drafting cannot take place in a vacuum. Accurate background
studies must be prepared, and some consensus must be reached as to the
kinds of reform that should be pursued. Otherwise, fine laws may be
written only to gather dust. Unfortunately, donors and governments of-
ten pursue law reform efforts in precisely such a vacuum.
A cynic might conclude that the laws and government bodies that
emerge from such reform efforts are just symbols intended to satisfy
public opinion by creating the appearance of progress even though the
government or donor was not truly interested in solving the particular
problem at hand. Although symbolic acts do take place, there is a pref-
erable explanation. Many donors have lacked an adequate appreciation
for the role of law. Development has almost always been considered a
matter of economics and technology, and the composition of the staff at
development agencies generally reflects that perspective. Governments
in many developing countries suffer from the same lack of legal capacity
and influence. Law reform is, therefore, an afterthought in many in-
stances, an exercise that is lightly staffed and lightly financed.
Such views are beginning to change. Law reform cannot be divorced
from the process through which national environmental policy is articu-
lated. Legal and institutional issues must inform that debate, and law re-
form, in turn, must be informed and guided by the resulting policy. In
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this way environmental management can become an integrated whole
rather than just a diverse collection of pieces. Through such a compre-
hensive approach, policy can be translated into effective laws and regu-
lations. And through such a comprehensive approach, institutions can be
shaped and strengthened in such a way that they will give life to that le-
gal regime.
To launch such a reform effort, however, requires donors and govern-
ments alike to appreciate the relationship between environmental, legal,
and institutional problems on the one hand, and environmental, legal, and
institutional solutions on the other. Such an effort requires one more
critical ingredient - political will on the part of both donors and the re-
cipient nations. If they can summon the political courage to join together
to build and maintain strong, rational environmental programs, then a
significant step will have been taken toward ensuring that the promise of
sustainable development will not be sacrificed on the altar of short-term
gain.

